Kenya : multiparty politics and the prospects for peace and stability in the neo-liberal age by Onyango, Makogango Maurice
KENYA: MULTIPARTY POLITICS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
AND STABILITY IN THE NEO-LIBERAL AGE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             ONYANGO MAKOGANGO 
                                          MAY 2005                   
                             UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE 
 
 
                              
 1
 
To my parents 
        And   
All my former University of Nairobi students especially, Ochanda Ogolla, the late 
Okoth Kobonyo and Wanambisi Simiyu, and many others whose names space will 
not allow me to mention here, for the courage they showed in the face of police 
brutality after our arrest and confinement at Nyayo house and Homa-Bay police 
station. Together, we stood up and challenged brutal repression, an action for 
which many Kenyans paid with their lives in Moi’s Kenya. It is a debt we all owed 
to humanity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
I would like to thank all those who have helped me in the course of writing this 
thesis. I am particularly grateful to Professor Bård Anders Andreassen for offering 
valuable advice in his capacity as my supervisor. Professor emeritus Colin Leys of 
Queens University in Canada offered advice on the scope of the paper and to him I 
express gratitude. Needless to say, the views expressed herein are mine. Special 
thanks also go to the coordinator and main lecturer of the Peace and Conflict 
Studies programme at the University of Oslo A. J. Semb. The two years I have 
spent in the course have been exciting. 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies revolves around how to understand international 
conflicts with a view to saying something on how their remedies can be designed. 
With the mainstream theories of these conflicts founded as they are on the 
behaviourist tradition in the social sciences, the methodology of the natural 
sciences remains the cherished ideal. But unlike the object of study in the natural 
scientist’s laboratory, human beings as objects of study in social inquiry talk. 
 
Coming as I do from Africa, a continent whose states and human population 
remain the focal subject matter of the peace builder’s ‘scientific inquiry’, I can 
only hasten to state that I enjoyed my dual role as a student of peace and conflict 
studies and as a reified object of study in the social scientist’ laboratory. It was a 
unique experience, may humanity realise our collective desire of living in a 
peaceful world. 
 
 
 
 
 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction                6 
1.1 On Theoretical Framework and Methodology            9 
1.2 Empirical Research and Liberal Democracy as ‘Democracy’         12 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Kenya’s Political Stability: The Theoretical Debate and the Faith in Liberal 
Democratic Transition               16 
2.1 Defining the Blueprint for Post Colonial economic Development         19 
2.2 Dependency Theory and the Critique of the Kenya Liberal Democracy 
Thesis…                 22 
        
CHAPTER THREE 
The 1992 Multiparty Elections: Democratic Transition or Electoral Transition 
without Transformation? ........................................................................        28 
3.1 The Opposition: Social Class, Ethnic Dynamics and the Case for Democratic 
Transformation. ……………………………………………          34 
3.2 The Changing Economic and Ethnic Political Basis in the Contest for State 
Control………………………………………            38 
3.3 After the Elections: Electoral Transition without Democratic 
Transformation.................................             48 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The 2002 Election and the exit of the Moi Regime: Third time Lucky or Third 
Time Doomed?  ……………………………………………          54 
4.1 The Exit of the Moi Regime and the Euphoria of Democratic Change        60 
 4
4.2 The Renewal of the Stalemate in the Democratic Transformation 
Process..........                65         
4.3 The Resurgence of Corruption in Government and the predatory State        68 
   
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Class Character of the State and The Kenyan Democratic Impasse: Some 
Reflections on the Liberal Democracy Debate…..           74 
 
ACRONYMS                81 
 
REFERENCES                82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
CHAPTER ONE 
 
General Introduction 
 
This thesis analyses the reintroduction of political competition and market 
liberalization or multiparty democracy and what implications this has for Kenya’s 
long term domestic peace and political stability. Will multiparty politics create a 
basis for a stable basis on which the institutions of liberal democracy can flourish 
as a foundation for economic growth within the framework of the current neo-
liberal international agenda? I argue that no evidence indicates that multiparty 
political competition and market liberalization which informs the post cold war 
‘third wave democracy’ project can tackle problems such as economic stagnation, 
social inequality, poverty and rising unemployment which threaten Kenya’s long 
term political stability. A sub-theme which runs throughout the thesis is a critique 
of the behavioral foundation of the mainstream theories of democratic transition 
which treat the controversy over what democracy constitutes thereby foreclosing 
the search for alternative models in understanding developments in non 
industrialized states like Kenya. 
 
The early part of the 1990’s saw many African states move from authoritarian 
one- party regimes of various kinds to embrace multiparty politics. This 
development which came in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states in Eastern Europe, was interpreted by many observers as part and 
parcel of a wider global liberal democratic wave that was sweeping the world, and 
which soon came to be known as the “third wave of democracy” after the usage of 
that term by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1991). The period saw the 
emergence of a new ideology which criticized the former developmental state of 
the post-colonial African era for excessive economic intervention and advocated a 
reduction in their role as a way of embracing free market and private enterprise 
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based on neo-liberal economic prescriptions. A combination of multiparty liberal 
democracy and markets subsequently became central features of a comprehensive 
strategic vision of post cold war developmental success for many African states. 
 
Other analysts also read in these developments the beginning of an epoch that was 
destined to culminate in an irresistible movement away from authoritarianism to 
democratic ideals across the globe (Fukuyama 1989). The period, according to 
these observers represented the triumph of liberal democratic ideals and hence the 
attendant assumption that the political changes that took place in ‘developing’ 
countries like Kenya marked the initial stages in a ‘transition to liberal 
democracy’. The state centered developmental approach which was a common 
feature of many third world countries in the 1960s and 1970s became an 
anachronism to be substituted by a less regulatory state whose role was limited to 
providing an efficient framework for the efficient functioning of the market. 
 
 Gordon White and Mark Robinson summarize the above development in their 
statement that “in this triumphalist political atmosphere of the years immediately after 
the defeat of communism, this vision of the relationship between politics and economics 
became a model of development correctness presented in overly optimistic ideological 
terms and rooted in largely unexamined stereotypes of both ‘markets’ and ‘democracy’” 
(Robinson & White 1998:18). The optimism bore semblance to the faith that 
dominated scholarship in the 1950’s and the early part of the 1960’s of growing 
democratization and equality. Following this emerging consensus, the post cold 
war world order subsequently rose above the earlier objections raised against 
‘transition to liberal democracy’ paradigm embodied in the attack on the central 
assumptions of the modernization theory towards the end of the 1960’s.   
 
Powerful forces, both international and domestic, thus combined to create the 
drive for competitive electoral party politics on the African continent. At the 
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outset, the current wave of multiparty politics was marked by relative optimism 
about the economic prospects of the new post cold war Africa regimes. But as 
many observers would readily admit today, the promised economic improvements 
and political stability have at best been slow or at worst non-existent in some 
African states. The initial fanfare about change and progress is slowly giving way 
to pessimism about the impact of democratization on the ills that have historically 
plagued Africa’s economic and political development.  
 
This thesis analyses the implications of multiparty politics for Kenya’s political 
and economic stability. Will the introduction of competitive political competition 
expressed largely in procedural and electoral terms lead to peace and economic 
stability in the context of the post cold war neo-liberal world order? I argue that 
contrary to the conventional wisdom of the day and the robust faith that followed 
in the wake of the introduction of multiparty politics, the Kenyan state is not 
destined to a liberal democratic transition as frequently pronounced by the 
exponents of the ‘third wave democracy’ paradigm. This study contends that 
market liberalization which represents the changing demands of international 
capital; far from aiding the process represent an impediment to Kenya’s 
democratic initiatives. Procedural democracy, I argue, is ill equipped to address 
fundamental socio-economic issues that lie at the root of Kenya’s current 
predicament. The thesis argues that electoral democracy is unlikely to lead to 
substantive changes needed to transform the Kenyan polity, and that might lead to 
contradictions where the state leans back on authoritarian methods as the most 
viable means of trying to contain rather than resolve the attendant conflicts.  
 
The analysis encompasses the period from 1992 when the first multiparty elections 
were held in Kenya to the present day (2005). I analyze the impact of the three 
multiparty elections (held in 1992, 1997 and 2002) on Kenya’s long term political 
and economic stability. The arguments advanced in this thesis revolve around the 
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following concerns which I consider pertinent to the current debate on the 
direction of Kenya’s democratic development: 
 
-The meaning and character of the liberal democratic ideal held as relevant to the 
Kenyan context and many other states considered today as being in ‘transition’. 
 
-Whether liberal democracy will provide a secure basis for preventing and 
managing conflict or will it worsen poverty and inequality thereby aggravating the 
prospects for conflict in Kenya? 
 
 -Can multiparty politics provide the basis for effecting the necessary socio-
economic transformation of Kenya’s underlying economic structure within the 
framework of post –cold war neo-liberal world order? 
 
-Whether formal or procedural elite democracy in the absence of socio-economic 
transformation will generate stable and predictable political institutions 
 
1.1 On Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
The embodiment of the debate on democracy and development after the 1950’s in 
“scientifism” following the behavioral revolution in American social sciences has 
largely continued today under the cloak of empiricism, stifling the debate on 
democracy and democratization within the bounds of its own definition. The 
requirements of a positivist oriented study of society to provide scientific 
credentials for its knowledge claims meant that social inquiry had to emulate the 
natural sciences in its methodology, procedures and the underlying rationale of 
constructing universal laws for social engineering. This goal which dates back to 
the enlightenment as represented by the aspirations of Augustine Comte to 
develop a rational ‘scientific’ social inquiry became a driving force in the post 
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War behavioral foundation of the social sciences. But as I will highlight here, the 
methodology implicitly treated certain historical political orders as “given and 
natural” thereby raising questions about the ideological content of its supposedly 
“neutral concepts” 
 
Having embraced behaviorism, democracy like other central concepts in social 
science required a yardstick against which its ‘scientific’ inquiry could be pivoted. 
That pivot subsequently became the institutions of liberal democracy based on the 
Western European historical experience. In the search for ‘measurable variables’ 
the focus shifted from the historical context to a timeless essence supposedly 
aimed at the study of ‘behavior’ and ‘hard observable facts’. But as Eric Wolf 
asserts “such schemes provide self fulfilling answers, since the phenomenon other than 
those covered by the model are ruled out of the court of specialized academic discourse” 
(Wolf 1982:10).  
 
The above theme is reflected in Colin Ley’s argument that the central concepts 
employed by conventional development theory are “largely sterile as tools for 
understanding what is happening in the third world” (Leys 1975: x) 
 In the methodological rigor that ensued, democracy simply became a 
methodological question with its normative underpinnings regarded as settled, 
identified as it were with the political structures the major industrialized states of 
Western Europe and North America. The political structures of these states and 
their historical evolution became the ideal against which the inadequacy of the 
political structures of other states would later be measured. This trend continues 
today in a largely positivist oriented research that still informs much of the 
analyses by the proponents of liberal democratic development in countries like 
Kenya. My theoretical analysis is partially aimed at overcoming the ideological 
(because it emerged within a particular historical context to legitimize a particular 
social order) constraints put on the research on democracy in equating it to 
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western liberalism and the attendant assumption, often unstated, that democracy 
means ‘liberal democracy’. 
 
Equating democracy to the political structures of Western industrialized states and 
conducting empirical research on that basis found a fertile ground in behaviorist 
social science founded on the robust faith in science and material progress through 
technology which marked the period immediately after the Second World War. 
This process was aided by the emergence of a dominant set of assumptions in 
post-war Western societies. These assumptions reflected growing convergence on 
what sort of society was desirable and hence the goal, focus and purpose of social 
science. Borrowing largely from the established methodologies of the natural 
sciences, the objective of the social sciences was thus underlined as one of 
generating a stable body of objective knowledge upon which social engineering 
could be premised. 
 
In the absence of major disagreements about the general direction of the society in 
the 1950’s, social scientists worked within a relatively uncontroversial framework 
with well defined social goals and objectives. The role of the social scientist and 
the attraction to the methodology of the natural sciences in the study of society 
remained largely unexamined during this period marked by consensus and 
anchored on the behavioral revolution. What this implied for social science was-
and still remains-the growth of empirical research with a relatively low level of 
theoretical sophistication and a rather clear set of policy applications. To the 
extent that there was disagreement or disputes among social scientists, it revolved 
around how the problems were resolved rather than their theoretical 
underpinnings. Normative issues of value appeared to be less important as there 
were no divergence in opinion among social scientists until the 1960’s. This 
postwar development contributed to what P.W. Preston in his analysis of the post-
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war discourse on development has called development theory’s ‘positivist 
orthodoxy’ (Preston. 1982) 
 
1.2 Empirical Research and Liberal Democracy as ‘Democracy’ 
 
An interesting paradox about the current research on democracy is that the 
institutions of liberal democracy (free elections, civil liberties, property rights etc) 
historically developed in opposition to popular democracy as it was understood 
from the antiquities. I do not intend to present a detailed account of how 
democracy became synonymous with liberal democracy, but it might be important 
to briefly refer to its history as its development is pretty relevant to the current on 
democracy and democratic transition. 
 
 A brief looks at history reveals the hostility with which the established elite 
responded to democracy as it evolved in Athens. This is captured by C.B. 
McPherson in his observation that “democracy used to be a bad word, everybody who 
was anybody knew that, democracy, in its original sense of the rule by the people or 
governance in accordance with the will of the bulk of the people, would be a bad thing –
fatal to individual freedom and to all graces of civilised living. That was the position 
taken by pretty nearly all men of intelligence from the earliest historical times down to 
about one hundred years ago, then within fifty years, democracy became a good thing” 
(McPherson 1966 p 1). Anthony Arblaster (Arblaster 1987) contends that contrary 
to popular belief, democracy was not ‘discovered’ by the Greeks but developed to 
characterise a reality that was emerging in Athens. That reality was the idea of the 
citizenry taking direct control of the affairs of the city state. Democracy in its 
original formulation challenged the existing social order and here lies the disdain 
with which it was held by the Greek elite from Plato through Aristotle to many 
other leading Greeks like the historian Thucydides. 
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Liberal representative democracy which much of the current discourse identifies 
with democracy developed in the 18th century after a revision that stripped the 
concept of its participatory nature. The idea of ‘representation’ until then unknown 
to democratic thinking thus became part and parcel of the political and academic 
discourse on democracy. E.M. Wood comments that this revision “meant that 
something hitherto perceived as the antithesis of democratic self-government was now 
not only compatible with but constitutive of democracy: not the exercise of political 
power but its relinquishment to others, its alienation (Wood 1995 p 216). 
 
 What thus made this revision necessary in the context of the antagonism which 
was generated by the evolution of democracy in its original version? Arblaster 
perhaps has an answer to this question; he contends that the main rationale for this 
revision of democracy was “to render it compatible with the existing political systems 
of the Western world which call themselves democracies’. Given this revised definition; 
it becomes natural to talk about preserving and defending democracy rather than 
achieving it, for it of course already exists in such fortunate countries as Britain and the 
United States (Arblaster 1987 p 55). This view finds support in the observation 
made by Thomas Carothers that economic aid and democracy promotion abroad in 
the post War period by both the United States and western Europe has had much 
to do with legitimizing the political system at home than the stated objectives 
(Carothers 2004) 
 
 In a similar vein Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor argue that liberal democracy 
developed out the efforts by the established classes to dilute what was felt to be 
the subversive capacity of democracy. As they point out, the institutions of liberal 
democracy “were shaped through the efforts of dominant groups to regulate popular 
participation. They wished to ensure that democracy did not interfere with emerging 
capitalist markets, and did this by making a sharp distinction between the public sphere 
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of politics and the private sphere of the economy and family life” (in Luckham & White 
2001:15). 
 
I have outlined the above historical revision of the theoretical content of the 
concept of democracy in order to highlight the implicit assumption advanced by 
the proponents of liberal democratic development that democracy is favourably 
equitable to liberal democracy or its liberal version that historically developed in 
Western Europe. To the extent that such consensus exists about the democratic 
character of such states, it must be pointed out that it owes its existence to 
arguments which considerably lie outside the domain of empirical research. 
Democracy thus remains a normative concept for which there exists no universal 
standard of evaluation, and that what is often presented as empirical 
methodological starting points in the debate on democracy are essentially 
normative questions that might never by methodological procedures however well 
defined and technical these may be. 
 
This thesis’ starting point is that identifying democracy with the political 
structures of Western states can be misleading as it confuses the historical human 
struggle for equality (which is what democracy is and has been) with its specific 
historical form-western liberalism-which historically emerged in Western 
European industrialized states. I have chosen to fashion a theoretical analysis in 
this thesis in an attempt to underscore some aspects of the struggle for democracy 
in Kenya that escape the intellectual lenses of “third wave democracy” scholars in 
search of its liberal version in the Kenya’s political developments. 
 
I will in my analysis rely on both primary and secondary material to further my 
arguments. These to a large extent include official policy documents, documents 
from international institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and the general literature from the debate on Kenya’s post colonial 
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democratic development that became known as ‘the Kenya debate’. I have also 
relied on material from Kenya’s two leading newspapers, The Daily Nation and 
The Standard.  I have adopted one analytical approach, perhaps to the exclusion of 
other equally viable theoretical approaches with all the limitations that this entails.   
I use the concept of ‘electoral transition’ to refer to the formal transfer of political 
power which leads to regime change following competitive elections while leaving 
fundamental economic and social relations intact. I have contrasted this to the 
concept of ‘democratic transformation’ which implies fundamental economic and 
social changes which stretch beyond mere electoral change. What sometimes is 
designated the term ‘substantive democracy’ as opposed to ‘procedural or formal 
democracy’. 
 
While economic stratification exists in societies and is openly acknowledged as 
can readily be discerned from the usage of terms like the rich and the poor or the 
privileged and the less privileged (only to mention but a few), usage of the concept 
of ‘class’ often generates controversy. Class occupies a central place in the 
Marxist critique of capitalism, but as Tom Kemp states, “a strong reluctance exists, 
or is built up, in capitalist society to the ideas and conclusions which are comprised in the 
Marxist theory of imperialism, as in Marxism as a whole…However prone many of the 
epigones (of Marx and Lenin) may have been prone to dogma and oversimplification, the 
fact that their opponents had nothing better to offer than contrary dogmas and 
assumptions must not be overlooked” (Kemp 1967: 163). Social class is broadly used 
in this paper to highlight the economic inequalities alluded to above and includes 
the assumption that these disparities essentially entail antagonism arising from 
conflicting interests. In the next chapter, I present a brief prelude to the debate on 
democratic transition in Kenya prior to the introduction of multiparty politics. 
 
 
 
 15
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Kenya’s Political Stability: The Theoretical Debate and the Faith in Liberal 
Democratic Transition. 
 
Kenya came under full fledged colonial rule in 1895 when the country became 
part of the British ease Africa protectorate joining Uganda that had become a 
protectorate a year before. When Kenya gained independence from colonial rule in 
1963, it did so under a Westminster style of government with Kenyatta as the 
prime minister. By 1970, however, the senate had been abolished, the prime 
minister had become an executive president, the opposition Kenya people’s union 
had been banned and a one party state controlled by Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) established. The above developments put Kenya on a path that 
was becoming rather familiar in many parts of the decolonized world. The 
excitement of the liberals who had expressed robust faith in the sustainability of 
liberal democratic regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America was quickly 
replaced by guarded optimism at best and sheer pessimism at worst. 
 
The liberal constitution tailored on the British model was in line with 
developments in other parts of the continent where departing colonial powers-
except in countries where independence was won through outright military 
struggle-were equipping the former colonies with political structures similar to 
that of their soon-to-be former colonial powers. In the context of the struggle for 
independence, lifting the restrictions placed on political participation by the 
besieged colonial powers became a noble cause for the independence movement 
as it allowed mass mobilization against colonial rule. Political competition also 
served to give legitimacy and international respectability in the context of the 
transition to independence. It was thus no surprising that with independence won, 
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the rationale for political competition diminished, replaced by the doctrine of the 
mass single party in the context of the cold war.                                                                                   
 
But the fast degeneration of the Kenyan state, like many other African states into 
single party dictatorships did not equally lead to a degeneration of the earlier faith 
in liberal democracy. The intellectual proponents of liberal democracy adjusted to 
the diminishing prospects of democratic governance in the belief that maximizing 
economic growth took precedence over liberal doctrines of political competition. 
Internationally, the logic of the cold-war dictated the need for reliable allies and 
few in the West seemed overly embarrassed by authoritarian dictatorships like 
what Kenyatta’s KANU was fast degenerating into only few years after 
independence. On the African continent in general, the ideology of subordinating 
democratization to economic growth under one party dictatorship was gaining 
momentum as fast as the growth in the number of its practitioners and intellectual 
defenders. 
 
In the reasoning of the time, most development economists remained sympathetic 
to the state-centered development strategy of the post-war period. With 
Independence won, the goal shifted to maximizing rapid economic development 
and putting an end to neocolonial control of the economy. This recipe was 
contained in the dominant theory that emerged in the wake of the decolonization 
process in Africa which readily accommodated the belief that economic 
development came first and that democratization would follow in its heels. The 
central arguments in this school of thought were spelt out in the thesis of the 
‘modernization’ theory which held a paradigmatic sway over much of the 
discourse on ‘third world’ development during the first two post-war decades. 
Having divided the world into ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, ‘developed and’ 
‘underdeveloped’, the theory constructed an ideal against which the developments 
of states outside the core of world capitalism like Kenya could be interpreted. 
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Implicitly holding the political structure of the United States as that ideal, the 
assumptions of the modernization school fitted well with the post War American 
intervention strategy of creating a stable world order conducive to its domestic 
economic needs and forestalling the spread of communism. 
 
Flag independence came to Kenya in 1964 at the height of the hegemonic 
discourse of the modernization theory as a paradigm for economic and political 
development.  As many analysts have pointed out (Roxborough 1988, Leys 1996), 
the modernization discourse was Eurocentric in its assumptions that economic and 
social developments in African states would allow them after some time to “catch 
up” with the more advanced industrialized states. The theory saw as positive the 
transformation which the colonial edifice had set in motion by breaking down the 
traditional patterns of production thereby putting Kenya on the path of capitalist 
development. Its assumption was a continuation of Europe’s earlier civilizing 
mission interpreted during the post-war development discourse in terms of capital 
input and technological aid of various kinds. As Roxborough notes, “it provided the 
rationale for the presence of thousands of foreign Western nationals, living well at the 
expense of African governments and a variety of international bodies representing 
themselves as working in the name of progress” (Ibid. p.753). 
 
On the overall Kenya registered positive economic growth in the first two decades 
after independence and the export oriented economic growth strategy adopted by 
the Kenyatta regime received positive evaluation. Many observers remained 
optimistic that this growth would eventually lead to liberal democratic 
development. The structure of Kenya’s economy-heavily reliant on agriculture-
was left intact by the post-colonial regime. In the agricultural sector where the 
much talked about ‘indigenization’ (transfer of land to African ownership and 
management) had taken place, it did so without interfering with pattern of large 
scale landholdings which the departing colonial government feared would 
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undermine productivity. In the manufacturing sector, the government accepted the 
continued domination of the Kenyan Asians entrepreneurs whose technical 
competence was considered essential for maintaining efficiency and productivity 
during this early phase after decolonization (Himbara 1994)  
 
2.1 Defining the Blue Print for Post Colonial Economic Development  
 
Kenya’s political and economic development was for the reasons highlighted 
above followed with keen interest in the first decades after Independence, for 
unlike neighboring Tanzania (where the ruling party (CCM) under Nyerere was 
talking “socialism”), and Uganda (where the UPC under Obote maintained a 
similar rhetoric), Kenya under the leadership of Kenyatta settled on a liberal 
economic growth as outlined in “sessional paper no. 10” of 1965 which spelt out 
Kenya’s long term economic and political development. A paper which despite 
outlining a blueprint for export oriented capitalist growth was given a socialist 
label (“sessional paper no.10 on African socialism”) to appeal to the post-colonial 
rhetorical stance of breaking with colonialism. 
 
Liberation from colonial rule had been predicated on undoing both the economic 
and the political structure on which colonialism rested and within the context of 
the cold, it was an unstated article of faith that such a development would be 
incompatible with capitalist growth. It was therefore crucial to pay lip service to 
socialism as Kenyatta’s government was demonstrating. Engineered by Tom 
Mboya who played a central role in the transition, the policy document “African 
socialism and its application to planning in Kenya” defined however an export 
oriented liberal economic growth that was aimed at domesticating the structure of 
the economy inherited from the departing colonial government.  
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 As a political tool, it was aimed at undercutting the current of radical nationalism 
and marginalizing the radicals within the ruling party agitating for land 
redistribution and other economic reforms. Its essence in economic terms was 
summarized in the now much quoted attack leveled against Bildad Kaggia (a front 
figure in the independence struggle) in 1965 by Kenyatta at a political function in 
Kandara where he rebuked the former for not having acquired property like other 
leading figures of the independence struggle had. Incensed by Kaggia’s persistent 
call for land reform, kenyatta quipped, “we were together with Paul Ngei in jail. If 
you go to Ngei’s home, ha has planted a lot of coffee and other crops. What have you 
done for yourself? If you go to Kubai’s home, he has a big house and has a nice shamba. 
Kaggia, what have you done for yourself? We were together with Kungu Karumba in jail, 
now he is running his own buses. What have you done for yourself? (The times, 11 April 
1966). This was the basis on which the land tenure system on which colonialism 
rested was inherited by the independence government amidst internal opposition. 
 
In the countdown to establishing his authoritarian one party rule, Kenyatta 
maintained the exhausted refrain that his government was ‘not a colonial 
government’ to deserve agitation. It was a timely reminder to those who had hoped 
for a complete break from political oppression under the colonial experience that 
the new post colonial regime intended to retain central elements of the colonial 
state so as to exercise power and control. Export oriented economic growth in the 
context of the post-war international economic boom thus became the hallmark of 
Kenyatta’s post-colonial regime. Democratization was however deferred to a later 
date as the government sought to contain its critics through the instruments of the 
strong state which the reasoning of the time held vital in the initial phase of 
national economic development.  
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Table 2.0: Kenya’s pattern of trade: visible imports/exports in 1970, by value (K£, 000) 
____________________________________________________________ 
    Exports to  Imports from 
____________________________________________________________ 
Tanzania   14,752   5,938     
Uganda   16,698            10,048 
Rest of Africa                9,158              1,833 
UK    14,847            41,459 
W. Germany     6,817                       11,197 
Rest of W. Europe  13,303                       24,501 
E. Europe    1,952              3,476 
USA     6,357            11,906 
Canada               1,805      796 
Middle East   2,272             14,292 
India    2,735    3,104 
Japan    1,225             15,196 
Other            11,135             14,266 
Total          10, 3056           158, 01 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Statistical abstract 1971. 
 
Table 2.1: Kenya’s economic prospects in a comparative perspective in the early years 
after independence 
__________________________________________________________ 
                             Population   1969 GNP     Average growth  Aid recipients  Aid recipients 
                             1969             per capita      rates of real GDP   1965-1970          per capita 
                             (millions)         ($)             1960-1970   (%)     ($ millions)        1965-70 ($) 
Kenya  10.5            136   5.1      455.83     43 
Uganda              8.3        118             6.7                     184.67             22 
Tanzania  12.9              96            4.3                     269.53             21 
Zaire                 17.0              98            2.6                     679.83             40 
I. Coast               4.2            300            7.9                     330.02             78 
Africa 
(Average)          --               150            1.7                     --                       -- 
India                 536.9            89             3.7                    6,804.99            13 
Latin  
America 
(Average)             --             475           5.4                            --                  -- 
 
Source: UNCTAD : Handbook of international trade and development statistics 1972 
 
Kenya was thus largely viewed by the adherents of the modernization school as a 
stable polity that was well destined for a transition to a liberal democratic state. 
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This optimism informed much of the discourse on development on Kenya as long 
as the post-war economic boom remained a feature of the world economy and the 
country registered positive economic growth largely measured in liberal economic 
terms. Modernization theory as a paradigm assumed relevance to a large number 
of other countries that came to be lumped together under labels like “third world 
states”, “transitional states” “developing countries” and other connotations 
emphasizing their linear corollary to the industrialized states assumed to be 
developed and democratic. It was derived principally from an interpretation of the 
patterns of liberal democratic changes that had characterized the major 
industrialized states in their historical development. The theory became a powerful 
tool and a universal model for projecting the linear democratic prospects for 
countries like Kenya and a host of other non-industrialized states experiencing 
state directed economic growth under various forms of dictatorships. 
 
2.2 Dependency Theory and the Critique of the Kenya Liberal Democracy 
Thesis 
 
With the question of democratization relegated to the background in favor of a 
strong state that could maximize economic growth, Western powers stepped up 
their efforts to nurture relationships with states like Kenya which were willing to 
stand up to the Soviet sponsored ‘socialist orientation’ in Africa. But then, during 
the early part of the 1970,s the much cherished liberal thesis that Kenya’s liberal 
economic growth would lead to mass political mobilization came under scathing 
attack from analysts of the dependency school who argued that, far from being 
‘scientific’, modernization theory embodied the hegemonic position of the 
advanced industrialized societies and that its central concepts like ‘modern’, 
‘traditional’, ‘developing’ and others could hardly be employed as conceptual 
tools in capturing the development that was unfolding in the relationship between 
industrialized states and their counterparts designated as “developing states”. 
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 On the African political in scene in general, the practical limitations of formal 
independence had become manifestly apparent and the term “neo-colonialism” 
had been incorporated into the political vocabulary to underline the inability of 
national governments to pursue independent economic and political growth 
strategies despite flag independence. The original optimism that had characterized 
the earlier discourse on development and democracy entered the second decade 
only with guarded optimism, at best and general despair, at worst. 
 
The critical assessment of modernization theory’s assumptions was inspired by the 
paradigm setting attack levelled at its record of development in Latin America by 
the German-American Andre Gunder, Frank. His thesis which laid the foundation 
for what was to be known as ‘dependency theory’ pointed out that despite having 
had formal independence for over a century, Latin American countries were not 
realising the economic dividends promised by modernization theory (Frank 1971). 
Coinciding as it did with the end of the post-war economic boom and the U.S. 
entanglement in Vietnam, the theory laid down the parameters for a critical 
assessment of the “transition paradigm” that was to culminate in a major re-
examination of its core assumptions. Frank’s neo-Marxist inspired analysis of 
political and economic developments in Latin America was to provide an 
analytical tool for many in the field frustrated by the gap between the realities in 
most developing countries and the rosy promises of transition to liberal democracy 
and stability.  
 
The dependency critique, as P. Hetherington put it “characterized the new 
undemocratic regimes of Africa, as at best inferior partners, at worst puppets of 
international capital, serving the interest of a new African comprador class” 
(Hetherington 1993p. 89). Employing a political economy approach, the theory 
highlighted unequal trade and investment relationships between the advanced 
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industrialized states and other non-industrialized states like Kenya which existed 
on the fringes of the international economy. The expanding world economy in 
which these ‘developing states’ had been integrated stunted their growth due to the 
international division of labour which had turned these countries into suppliers of 
raw material and markets for industrial output. The eventual flight of capital for 
re-investment in the core areas of the international economy was further seen as 
re-enforcing this ‘underdevelopment’. 
                                                                                                                                 
The framework for the debate on Kenya was provided by E.A. Brett (Brett 1973), 
Colin Leys (Leys 1975) and Steven Langdon (Langdon 1976). Leys’ 1975 seminal 
work-Underdevelopment in Kenya- was to be a paradigmatic example of the 
application of dependency theory to Kenya’s post-colonial political and economic 
development even though he was to enlist himself later to the critique of 
dependency theory that surfaced in the late 1970’s. In underdevelopment in Kenya 
however, Leys pointed out that contrary to the contentions of the liberal 
democratic theorists, Kenya was not bound for a transition to liberal democracy. 
He concluded that “the ‘stability’ of Kenya in 1971, on which it was so frequently 
congratulated by western journalists, was therefore an appearance which resulted directly 
from the assertion of state power by the currently dominant combination of classes, and 
did not reflect the underlying reality of increasingly sharp social and economic 
contradictions” (Ibid: 274). This was to crystallise  into the debate that raged until 
the early part of the 1980’s about the political and economic direction of the 
Kenyan polity and which became known as the  “Kenya debate” (Leys 1996). 
 
The Kenya debate which was about the plausibility of Kenyan state developing a 
capitalist economic base as a basis for liberal democratic development involved 
two protagonists , the neo-Marxists interpretation of Kenya’s development by the 
dependency theorists and the classical or ‘orthodox Marxism respectively. In a bid 
to counteract the arguments of the dependency theorists that capitalist 
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development on which liberal politics could be based was impossible, Michael 
Cowen conducted his research where he sought to demonstrate that an 
‘accumulating class’  existed among the Kikuyu community and that it predated 
colonialism (Cowen 1977). He therefore concluded that an accumulating class 
existed in Kenya and since this class was indispensable for capitalist growth, 
Kenya had a basis for capitalist development. Leys took into account Cowen’s 
analysis and revised his earlier thesis to accommodate the possibility of a capitalist 
development in Kenya. He argued in 1978 that the question should be treated as 
one which was open and not foreclosed. 
 
But two analysts of Kenya’s industrial development, Steven Langdon and Raphael 
Kaplinsky joined the debate and argued that in as much as the question of Kenya’s 
capitalist development could be left open; it was so unlikely that one could as well 
pronounce it impossible. Kaplinsky advanced the position that Kenya lacked a 
large internal market on which such a development could be predicated and that 
the international conjuncture of events that had provided the atmosphere in which 
the newly industrialised countries (NICs) developed was simply not present 
(Kaplinsky1980). Langdon on his part argued that the heavy dependence of the 
Kenyan capitalist class on foreign capital meant that they could not undertake the 
necessary changes needed for national capitalist transformation (Langdon 1987). 
But beyond contributing in undermining the theoretical basis, on which 
development and democratization theory was previously anchored, the direction of 
the Kenyan state remained unresolved by the combatants in the Kenya debate and 
the central issues which preoccupied their concern lingered on. 
 
For a brief period in the first half of the 1970’s, however, there was no consistent 
effort from the theorists who had embraced the liberal democracy paradigm to 
counteract the arguments advanced by the dependency theorists. Dependency 
theory in its original formulation held sway among many African scholars and 
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even appealed to the populist rhetoric of many radical politicians frustrated by the 
diminishing prospects for economic progress. Even the World Bank appeared to 
be half heartedly acknowledging the criticism of the theory as evidenced in  
chairman McNamara’s emphasis on ‘the principle of meeting basic needs’ at its 
annual meeting in Nairobi in 1973.  There was now an open admission that most 
of the countries in Africa and the rest of the ‘developing world’ that had been 
assumed would “catch up” were either threatened with economic stagnation or 
lack of internal cohesion. A muted despair was emerging both in the intellectual 
discourse and the practical field of development.  
 
In the countdown to consolidating his power following the regime transition in 
1978, president Moi stepped up political repression in a bid to contain internal 
opposition and declared the his regime was going to follow in the footsteps of 
Kenyatta. Kenya approached a new decade with diminished faith in liberal 
democratic development. The perspective of some analysts (Leys 1975) that the 
social forces that had been repressed under Kenyatta could come to the surface 
with a power vacuum upon his death with an eventual re-alignment of alliances 
became a telling synthesis looked at from the repressive measures adopted by the 
Moi regime in the countdown to consolidating his political position in the wake of 
the regime change after Kenyatta’s death. 
 
In the meantime, radical policy re-orientation was looming in the horizon of the 
general interaction between the western world and African states. In response to 
the failure of the developmental state after almost two decades of uneasy 
economic nationalism, the terms of interaction between western states and African 
regimes changed in what was to signal the beginning of what became known as 
the ‘neo-liberal reconstruction of the world in the 1980’s’. The decade heralded an 
open acknowledgement of a debacle in Kenya’s economic development as was the 
case elsewhere in the continent. The organization of African unity (OAU) outlined 
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a plan in 1980 (the Lagos plan) to salvage African economies in the face of 
declining economic growth.  
 
It was however the World Bank’s change in policy that was to herald a dramatic 
break with the state centred economic wisdom of the 1970s. Acting on the 
recommendations of the Berg report of 1981(which indicted African states’ 
development record amidst increasing foreign debt), the World Bank introduced 
conditionality for its lending and the international monetary fund and Western 
donor countries followed suit in demanding economic liberalisation as a basis for 
further lending. It marked the birth of neo-liberal phraseology in Africa’s 
economic development. 
 
The assumptions on which modernization theory was founded and sustained for 
almost two decades was now challenged not only in academic discourse but by the 
changes that were beginning to take place in the real world. The period 
characterised by economic nationalism on which its basic assumptions had been 
premised had disappeared by the 1980’s. National and international control of the 
movement of capital were being removed as the international economy integrated 
dramatically, limiting the powers of any state wishing to promote national 
development. Submission to the logic of the market replaced national planning in 
non-industrialised states like Kenya where the external call for renouncing state 
intervention gained an irresistible momentum and as the world economic order 
changed to reflect the demands of trans-national capital. Glaring poverty, chaos 
and upheavals were also the scenarios in most parts of the developing world after 
many years of capital and technological input. The foundations of modernization 
theory as a programme for change had been undermined by both its critics and 
actual changes taking place in the real world. 
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With the ascendance of neo-liberalism as an agenda for change in the 1980’s, the 
focus then shifted to market and social movements, communities, political parties 
and other social entities generally referred to as ‘civil society’. It was however not 
until after the end of the cold war following the breakdown of the Soviet Union 
that market liberalization and multiparty politics became the unquestioned recipe 
for political and economic change. A largely external impetus developed to give 
the impending change a neo-liberal content. Traditionally silent over Moi’s 
excesses over much of the 1980’s, the United States broke with tradition and 
fronted a vocal criticism of the regime’s political repression and economic 
mismanagement. International donors stepped forward and suspended a $ 250 
million package in economic aid to Kenya in 1991.  
 
In December 1991, Moi announced the end of the one party rule and the re-
introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya. It is against this background that I 
analyze the renewed faith in the survival of liberal democracy as a basis for peace 
and stability in Kenya following the removal of the constitutional clause which 
prohibited the formation of political parties besides the ruling party KANU. It was 
however not until December 1992 that the multiparty elections finally took place 
under the tutelage of the same regime that had put a spirited opposition to its 
introduction. Overseen by a host of international observers, political competition 
got underway and however imperfect the result was, Kenya was supposedly put 
back on its perverted liberal democratic development. What this development 
entails for Kenya’s long term political and economic stability is the subject matter 
of this analysis. The next chapter looks at the first multiparty elections held in 
1992 and asks whether those elections enhanced the prospects for democratic 
transformation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The 1992 Elections: Democratic Transition or Electoral Transition Without 
Transformation? 
 
Following an internal wave of protest and mounting pressure from Western 
governments and international financial institutions, the Moi regime succumbed 
and held multiparty elections on 29 December 1992. The elections marked the end 
of the monopoly on political power by the ruling party KANU (Kenya African 
National Union) since independence from colonial rule in 1964, and the “big 
Man” personal chieftaincy of President Daniel Arap Moi which had 
institutionalized political repression as a mode of governance since assuming 
office in 1978. The Kenyan election was greeted with immense euphoria coming 
as it did in the heels of the political changes spanning the globe following the end 
of the cold war.  
 
Although Kenya became a defacto one party state in 1964 following the merger 
between KANU and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), Kenya’s first 
President had allowed periodic political renewal of his leadership by sanctioning 
national assembly but not presidential elections. These national assembly elections 
even continued after the banning of the opposition party KPU (Kenya People’s 
Union) which reintroduced opposition politics in postcolonial Kenya in 1966 
before it was effectively outlawed in 1969. But the presidency was to remain a 
sacred office not open to political contest until the multiparty elections in 1991. 
The elections were therefore, as many observers were at pains to point out a 
“watershed” in Kenya’s search for democratic transformation (Barkan 1993) or as 
in the words of the commonwealth observer group, “a giant step on the road to 
multiparty democracy” (Commonwealth observer report 1992: 63). Even though a 
plethora of international observers arraigned to observe the elections faulted the 
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process on procedural terms, they remained optimistic about Kenya’s democratic 
future. The local and international consensus that a democratic transition was 
unfolding in Kenya was simply overwhelming. 
 
The early part of the 1980’s had witnessed a dramatic decline in Kenya’s 
economic growth and an increase in political repression as Moi and his close 
associates sought to establish what towards the end of the 1980’s would become 
one of Africa’s best known scenarios of  personal rule exercised through orders 
and decrees. Moi sought political control and macro-economic management of the 
economy aimed at rewarding political loyalty and discouraging dissent. He was 
determined to put into ‘good use’ the tools of statecraft he had learnt during his 
long tutelage as Kenyatta’s vice president. Kenyatta had enjoyed unquestioned 
authority, having been at the helm of the struggle for independence from colonial 
rule, and after independence KANU under his stewardship resorted to a strategic 
posture of carrots and sticks in handling opposition to the regime.  
 
Kenyatta’s post-colonial regime adopted selective economic incentives aimed at 
strengthening the basis of his political support which largely revolved around his 
ethnic Kikuyu community and other related kin groups as the Embu and Meru of 
Eastern province. These groups benefited disproportionately from government 
allocation of public services like health, education, access to credit and 
appointment to public service. It was a practice that Moi was to give a new lease 
of life upon his assumption of power in 1978, and one that he was to implement 
with the zeal of a fanatic in a concerted effort to build his political patronage by 
co-opting into the political fold those groups that had been marginalized by the 
Kenyatta regime.  
 
Kenyatta,s patronage was exercised in the relative calm of the political euphoria 
after the decolonization process and the post-war economic growth that Kenya 
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experienced under his leadership earned him the dubious tag of ‘benevolent 
dictator’. When Moi set out to replicate the practice of disproportionate favoritism 
of political clients upon assuming the presidency, the narrow political base of his 
power called for repressive measures that made a radical departure from 
Kenyatta’s benevolent authoritarianism and sentenced Kenyans to thirteen years of 
unquestioned ‘personal rule’ that rewarded political sycophancy and clamped 
down hard on dissent, it was a sentence Kenyans would serve without parole. 
 
The changing balance of social forces upon Moi’s assumption of power was to 
underline what was becoming a fact in Kenyan politics, the mobilization of state 
machinery to bestow economic and political advantages to partisan groups on 
which the support for the regime rested -the settlers during the colonial period, the 
ethnic Kikuyu community during the Kenyatta era, and with Kenyatta’s demise, 
the ascendance into state bureaucracy of Moi loyalists drawn mainly from his 
ethnic Kalenjin community and other minority ethnic groups that had found 
themselves on the periphery of Kenyan politics during Kenyatta’s reign. The 
struggle that ensued in the wake of the reorganization of the apparatus of the state 
to reflect this new reality generated a political culture fear and sycophancy on 
which was came to be the foundation of Moi’s leadership as long as it lasted. 
 
In 1982 following an aborted coup attempt led by members of the Kenya Air 
force, Moi tightened his political hold on power to underline his personal rule and  
by the mid 1980’s his omnipresence in every aspect of Kenya’s body politic had 
become a fact of life. Rampant corruption in government coincided with the 
international economic crisis of the 1980’s to erode Kenya’s earlier positive 
economic growth. The economy declined, annual per capita income fell, basic 
social services like roads collapsed while unemployment and poverty increased in 
aggregate terms. Real economic growth slumped from where it had averaged 
between 3 and 4.9 percent in the 1980’s to 2.2 percent in 1991. The image of 
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Kenya held out to many countries in Africa as a model for successful economic 
development within the capitalist framework had gradually dwindled into the 
oblivion by 1989 when the international realignment of forces were taking place 
across the globe following the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states in Eastern Europe. 
 
Apprehensive over what could be an impending popular revolt in Kenya, Western 
governments joined the fray to pressurize the regime for change. On 25-26 
September 1991 at a meeting held in Paris, Kenya’s bilateral aid donors suspended 
economic aid for six months making it contingent upon the adoption of multiparty 
politics or ‘good governance’ as they put it.  An internal opposition that had been 
fermenting against the Moi regime was then given impetus and cover by Western 
governments and international financial institutions culminating in the multiparty 
elections held for the first time on December 29 1992.  
 
By 1990, defiance against the regime had taken overt forms. It galvanized the 
disaffected elite from the legal profession, the established churches and business 
before it was given its mass appeal by ordinary citizens. Its external dimension 
came to be represented by the vocal agitation of the American Ambassador to 
Kenya Smith Hempstone whose name was to become synonymous with the local 
opposition to the Moi regime in the countdown to multiparty politics. In the 
countdown to the elections, cracks emerged within the single front that had 
consolidated itself against the government. Having reluctantly accepted the 
demand for change, the specter of a fragmented opposition was a welcome 
reprieve for Moi who had strategically counted counted on the fission to retain 
political power.  
 
In the subsequent election conducted in December 1992, Moi returned to power as 
an elected president having garnered 36% of the total votes cast. This put him 
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ahead of other rival opposition parties whose total percentage constituted the 
remaining 64% of the remaining votes cast but whose inability to field a single 
presidential candidate had indirectly aided the regime’s quest to cling to power.  
Misgivings from the opposition about electoral irregularities notwithstanding, a 
new era had dawned on Kenya with Moi at the helm of it as an elected president. 
The ruling party KANU won 100 seats in the new 188 member parliament against 
the opposition’s 88 seats. Armed with a new mandate, the new KANU under Moi 
set out to reassert its waning political power. 
 
Table 3.0 Kenya Election Results 1992 
 Total Nairobi Central Eastern Coast North- Rift-   Western   Nyanza 
                                                                                                                Eastern Valley         
____________________________________________ ____ _____________________________________ 
Provincial as % 
 of total vote.   100   7 19 15 6  1 27 10 15              
   Turnout as 
 % of registered    68 56 84 62 48 41 76 63 63 
   Voters                       
______________________________________________________________________________________                                    
  Presidential 
(% of vote)     
 
Moi (KANU)    36 17  2 37 62 78 66 40 14    
Matiba (FORD-A)  26 44 60 11 11 11 19 38   2 
Kibaki (DP)     19 19 36 50 10   3   8   3   7            
Odinga (FORD-K) 17 20   1   2 16   8  6 18 76         
 
Parliamentary 
(no of seats won)                      
 
KANU   100 1   0 21 17 8 36 10   7           
FORD-A    31 6 14   0  0 0  4             2   0            
DP     23 0 10   9  1 0  2   0   1 
FORD-K     31 1   1   1  1 2  2   3 20                      
Others        3 0   0   1  0 1  0   0   1                             
Total seats  188 8 25 32 20         10 44 20 29                  
% Incumbents     26       12  4 34 45         60 34 25 14           
won 
% old Faces   54        38 36 59 65        50 59 55 55 
won                        
 
Source: Joel D. Barkan, 1993  
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3.1 The Opposition: Social Class, Ethnic Dynamics and the Case for 
Democratic Transformation. 
 
In the aftermath of the elections, the Moi regime armed with a new mandate 
adopted a dual strategy of partially recognizing the opposition and seeking to 
contain the same through political intimidation. There was on one hand the 
concerted effort to demonstrate to the external world that there was indeed a 
genuine democratic political space in the context of the changed political climate, 
and on the other hand, the temptation by the new Moi regime to resort to familiar 
autocratic methods in containing an opposition that had duly shaken his hold on 
political power. The liberal democratic faith was sustained in the aftermath of the 
elections in the opposition’s complaints about irregularities that marked the voting 
exercise and, that Moi had had after all retained the presidency with a minority 
vote. 
 
The prospects for Kenya’s democratic development came to be analyzed against a 
backdrop of a fragmented opposition which should otherwise have united to put an 
end to the Moi regime, in effect furthering the prospects for democratic 
governance in Kenya (Ndegwa, 2002, Barkan 1993, Harbeson1998). But as future 
developments would later demonstrate, tying Kenya’s democratic future to the 
removal of the Moi regime seriously overlooked the conflicting interests of the 
social classes that had been mobilized in opposition to the regime. Such analyses 
failed to place the political agenda of the opposition in the economic matrix of 
class politics that has governed Kenyan politics since independence from colonial 
rule in the early 1960’s.Locating the democratization process within the context of 
conflicting interests among the different social formations, and how state 
machinery has been mobilized in the subsequent struggle is indispensable in 
giving a more nuanced account of the present impasse in Kenya’s democratic 
development. It might be useful here to refer briefly to this antagonism since its 
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central aspects are quite relevant to the current debate on the future of Kenya’s 
current liberal democratic project. 
 
A number of analysts have pointed out that the genesis of the prevailing crisis in 
Kenya’s democratic development stems from the specific characteristics of the 
post-colonial state, its method and form of accumulation in the years after 
independence, and the character of class forces that have historically steered this 
development (Leys 1975, Langdon 1981, Ajulu 1998). Having achieved 
independence from colonial rule in 1964 amidst internal contradictions rooted in 
the competing claims of different social formations largely fostered by 
colonialism, competition for control of the state apparatus became a hallmark of 
post-colonial Kenyan politics. Predicated on the uneven geographical and social 
development bred under colonialism, and which worked to produce regional 
inequalities which coincided with the spatial settlement of ethnic communities, 
ethnicity became a central factor that could be mobilized in defense of social or 
class interest.   
 
While an in-depth study of ethnicity lies outside the scope of this modest analysis, 
it is vital to point out that ethnicity far from being fixed and given as implied by 
analysts like Horowitz (Horowitz 1993) is dynamic and changing. Horowitz 
contends that “a major reason for the failure of democratization is ethnic conflict” 
(Ibid: 23).  But as Braathen, Bøås and Sæther state, ethnicity “must be understood in 
the light of the socio-economic context in which they operate, and within this context, 
ethnicity is just one among the many variables (Braathen, Bøås & Sæther 2000p 4). 
Politicized ethnicity (political mobilization of ethnic consciousness) which has 
characterized Kenya’s political and economic developments, far from being a 
fixed attribute is a product of a specific historical development. As Leys asserts 
“the foundations of modern tribalism were laid down when the various tribal modes and 
relations of production began to be displaced by a capitalist one giving rise to new forms 
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of insecurity”. ( Leys 1975: 199 ). As economic and social stratification heightened 
following the uneven development of the colonial economy, it became obvious 
that regional (ethnic) inequalities would structure future political contestations. As 
observed by Ajulu “ethnicity has thus become the medium through which class politics 
is mediated” (Ajulu 2002:251) 
 
The above view contrasts sharply with the one prevalent in the mainstream 
literature on democracy which sees ethnicity as the biggest obstacle to 
democratization as highlighted by Horowitz statement. The implicit contrast 
underlying such conclusions is the assumed dichotomy between modern and 
stratified nations of Europe and the still tradition bound ethnic communities of 
Africa. The distance between the Europeans and the natives coined during the 
colonial period and raised to the level of scientific truth by the evolutionary gospel 
of anthropology (Braathen, Bøås & Sæther 2000) are by no means things of the 
past in current academia. But ethnicity remains a dynamic concept capable of 
redefinition to suit different political contexts. A look at social class and ethnic 
interaction in Kenya’s economic and political developments highlights this 
phenomenon. 
 
The struggle for independence had brought together Kenya’s two single largest 
ethnic communities, the Kikuyus (22%) and the Luos (11%). The former hail from 
central Kenya around Nairobi and had been drawn into the independence 
movement under KANU in opposition to colonial policies, the most outstanding of 
which was land alienation to the white settlers which had left a good proportion of 
the community landless. Together with the Luos from the shores of Lake Victoria, 
they formed the core of the pre-independence KANU which campaigned for 
independence on a platform of a strong central government as opposed to a federal 
system which was being advocated for by the settlers, but which was seen in the 
context of the decolonization process as a renegade strategy by which the 
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departing colonial government sought to grant regional autonomy to the remaining 
white settlers as independence approached. KANU, by design or default had 
become a party of the majority ethnic groups.  
 
The smaller ethnic groups from Rift Valley, the Coast, and the north consolidated 
under KADU and adopted a less confrontational posture towards the colonial 
government. Their advocacy for federalism (majimboism) and liberal economic 
policies went well with the ambitions of the settlers and appealed to Western 
interests apprehensive about the future character of the post-colonial state which 
was now admittedly waiting in the wings. KADU’s leader Ronald Ngala came 
from the coastal town of Kilifi. This seemingly subtle alignment of social forces 
on the eve of independence would later define the fault lines of political 
contestation in the years after decolonization. 
 
Kenyatta’s presidency in the years after independence reinforced the political and 
economic dividing lines that had developed during the first years of multiparty 
politics under colonial guardianship. During Kenyatta,s leadership, the colonial 
economic structure which had been designed to preserve settler interest became a  
vital instrument in aiding capital accumulation by a rising Kikuyu business class 
whose primitive accumulation as earlier cited Cowen argued predated colonialism. 
But timeline for the accumulative enterprise notwithstanding, Kikuyu individuals, 
and to a lesser degree, the Luo elite gained prominence in public service, the 
armed forces and government corporations notwithstanding the recruitment of the 
elite from other educated ethnic communities. The much talked about 
‘indigenizing’ or ‘Africanizing’ the economy became a mechanism through which 
the regime fostered a new propertied class mainly drawn from the Kikuyu ethnic 
community. As under colonialism, this domination was regulated by authoritarian 
means heavily dependent on state machinery which the regime effectively 
controlled.  
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 One formidable challenge upon independence from colonial rule was how the 
post-colonial government would handle the problem of economic distortion that 
had been created by the settler economy. Lingering in the background was the 
burning question of large tracks of land that had been alienated to the white 
settlers for agricultural production, and which had sent many Kenyans into 
reserves and rendered individuals and communities landless. Having moved into 
political leadership, KANU under Kenyatta gradually moved away from the 
radical platform on which it had campaigned for independence thereby alienating 
the radical nationalists within its own ranks. The demand for land redistribution 
was sealed when the new regime obtained an £ 18 million loan to purchase the 
land from the settlers in order to sell it on a willing buyer willing seller basis.  
 
The issue of land redistribution had by this move been effectively circumvented as 
the post-colonial social class that took over state control sought to assume the 
privileges established under colonialism. As leys observed in his 1975 analysis of 
Kenya’s political developments, “the political aim of taking over the economy became 
merged almost imperceptibly with individual aspirations to take over the jobs, positions 
which the economy made possible; the immediate problem appeared to be to take over 
the economy, not to change it” (Leys 1975:265). The battle lines had been drawn, 
and with it the changing balance of social forces that would loom large in Kenya’s 
post-colonial political contestation. 
 
3.2 The Changing Economic and Ethnic Political Basis of in the Contest for 
State Control 
 
In the subsequent split caused by Kenyatta’s consolidation of his regime around 
his ethnic Kikuyu commercial interest, the radical opposition within KANU was 
sidelined leading to the formation of the opposition party KPU (Kenya People’s 
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Union) under the leadership of Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia. Moi, whose 
KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) had been co-opted into KANU in 1964 
was then drawn in as Kenyatta’s loyal lieutenant to fill the position of the vice 
presidency left vacant by Odinga’a resignation. Despite the elevation of Moi to the 
vice presidency, Kenyatta,s rule continued to use state protection to govern in a 
way that disproportionately favored the Kikuyu ethnic base of his political support 
which had constituted the core of the nationalist movement in the countdown to 
independence. 
 
 For Moi, as events would later demonstrate, acting as Kenyatta’s second in 
command was a 13 year long school whose lessons he would recall with a 
photographic memory upon assuming power after Kenyatta’s departure from the 
political scene. The principal lesson was how state could apparatus could be 
deployed in the process of capital accumulation and patronage built around 
ethnicity as a secure basis for political support. 
 
It had become increasingly evident that a clear economic class had emerged out of 
the dust of the struggle for independence and that this class had fast developed the 
awareness that it had to act politically to preserve the economic structure of 
benefits and privileges which colonialism had perpetuated, and which neo-
colonialism was now re-enforcing in new forms. Whereas primitive forms of 
capital accumulation predating colonialism might have existed among a section of 
the Kikuyu as Kenya analysts like Cowen contended, post independence economic 
developments saw the consolidation of this class as it moved to dominate central 
sectors of the economy to entrench itself as the class that would dominant role in 
Kenyan politics. A marked contrast was in the manufacturing sector which was 
left predominantly in the hands of Kenyan Asians at the prompting of international 
capital that feared ‘indigenization’ could lead to a drop in production as had been 
the case in Uganda and Tanzania. 
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 With the radical nationalists within KANU pushed to the political periphery, 
elements from the ‘settler friendly’ KADU incorporated into the government and 
the colonial land tenure system retained, the regime had accomplished a twin 
strategy of appeasing international capital by underlining continuity while at the 
same time strengthening a domestic class that would act in defense of the 
structural continuity that was being created in the transition from colonial rule. 
There had been apprehension regarding what policies the post-colonial regime 
would adopt regarding large scale commercial agricultural farms mainly in the 
hands of the settlers. This apprehension would soon vanish by the appointment of 
Bruce Mackenzie, a former settler farmer who was to become instrumental in 
overseeing the new regime’s land policy upon his appointment as the minister for 
agriculture where he remained until 1972. Sessional paper no. 10 outlined the 
overall strategy and with it, the seeds of the present day contradictions that 
underlie present day Kenya’s political and economic development were born. 
 
The development I have outlined above laid the framework for the contradictory 
class interests that have been at the core of Kenya’s democratic development. 
Economic growth in the years immediately after decolonization founded on the 
stable post war international economic boom and the euphoria that followed in the 
wake of independence downplayed the contradictory tendency of wealth creation 
in the midst of growing poverty. In this mood of consensus, few, if any seemed to 
be concerned that the social inequalities which were in effect re-enforcing ethnic 
cleavages could in the long run create political instability. In the era of one party 
rule and the reign of conventional development theory, Kenyatta’s iron fist rule 
remained unproblematic and was seen by many international analysts as a form of 
‘accountable authoritarianism’ (Barkan 1992, Cohen 2001).  
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It was popularly held throughout much of this period that Kenyatta was a leviathan 
who ruled for the good of the citizenry, that ‘good’ being economic growth 
reflected in a growing GDP, which such analysts held would lead to liberal 
democratic development. This is succinctly reflected in an analysis by John M. 
Cohen where he contends that “Kenyatta tolerated “good corruption” which was 
based on reasonable kickbacks” (Cohen 2001: 104).  But as it would become 
manifest in the lead to the transition to the Moi regime in 1978, the Kenyan post-
colonial arrangement was far from being a stable one as was demonstrated by the 
struggle for control of the state machinery as the aging Kenyatta’s departure from 
the political scene loomed. 
 
Moi’s ascendance to the throne in 1978 following Kenyatta’s death came against a 
backdrop of intense campaign by the ruling clique around Kenyatta to block him 
from assuming leadership of the state. The latent class character of Kenya’s post-
colonial development evidently became manifest as the dominantly ethnic Kikuyu 
upper class that the regime had propped joined ranks in an intense and vocal 
political campaign to safeguard their interest in the face of an uncertain transition. 
In what became known as the ‘change the constitution movement’ , this group’s 
intention-shortly before Kenyatta’s-to change the constitutional clause which 
provided that the vice President (read Moi) assumed the presidency in an acting 
capacity for 90 days upon the president’s death or resignation.  
 
The propertied social class nurtured and bred under Kenyatta’s leaderships and 
predominantly from a section of the Kikuyu ethnic group had a shared perception 
that Moi’s presidency would shift the centre of power and remove the state 
protection which had played a pivotal role in their capital accumulation. Moi was 
only able to assume power through the backing of a faction within this class led by 
the then powerful attorney general Charles Njonjo who had hoped Moi would be a 
stepping stone for his own power ambitions. But this was not to be, once in power, 
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Moi began to reorganize the state machinery in a process that would rank him 
alongside Mobutu as one of the vilest tyrants of the 20th century African continent. 
 
The increased repression under Moi’s predatory state looked at from this 
perspective, was a logical consequence that followed as state power tilted away 
from the social class that had become known as the ‘Kikuyu bourgeoisie’ that 
formed the central plank of the previous regime’s support. Moi’s leadership started 
on a populist note aimed at containing the formidable threat posed by the politico-
economic class that Kenyatta had created. He vowed to continue in Kenyatta,s 
footsteps and coined the word “Nyayo” meaning “footsteps” in Kiswahili to 
underline the continuity. But when he started the exercise of removing Kenyatt’s 
loyal henchmen from positions of political and economic power in order to build 
his system of disproportionate favoritism around his Kalenjin ethnic group and 
other minorities that had been the basis of KADU’s power base, Moi found his 
regime pitted against powerful interests and his populist rhetoric gave way to 
naked repression. He demanded total submission to his rule and indicated that his 
regime will not tolerate dissent. 
 
By 1984, the populist moment had gradually dwindled into the political oblivion 
and in a much quoted speech Moi summed up the new political dispensation, “I 
call on all ministers, Assistant ministers and every other person to sing like parrots. 
During Mzee Kenyatta’s period I persistently sang the Kenyatta tune until people said 
“this fellow has nothing except to sing for Kenyatta”. I say: I was in Kenyatta’s shoes and 
therefore, I had to sing whatever Kenyatta wanted. I f I had sung another song, do you 
think Kenyatta would have left me alone? Therefore you ought to sing the song I sing. If I 
put a full stop, you should also put a full stop. This is the way this country can move 
forward” (quoted in Andreassen 2003. 154). The 1982 coup attempt by members of 
the Kenya air force provided the occasion for stepping up the repressive 
machinery culminating in the hanging of the coup plotters and detention without 
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trial of a growing number of university students and their lecturers. The hope of 
liberal democratic development held by the adherents of the state centered post-
war development discourse had given way to despair and grim pessimism.  
 
Towards the end of the1980’s Moi had skillfully tilted the balance of state 
protection in favor of his cronies effectively shifting the economic power base 
from the Kikuyu business establishment while brokering a political rapprochement 
with a section of the same group for political support. His close ethnic confidants 
like Nicholas Biwott gained prominence in businesses that spanned from banking 
to petroleum distribution. A new class had emerged from the new beneficiaries of 
state protection revolving a round Moi’s ethnic Kalenjin community and other 
minority ethnic groups that had been KADU’s stronghold in the lead to 
independence. Moi had learned as Ajulu notes that “political power is more than a 
cabinet office; it is the access to key levers of the economy which constitute political 
power” (Ajulu 1998: 83). But Moi, always a skillful manipulator also held out 
political patronage and state protection to individual members of the old Kikuyu 
establishment and fragments of the Luo elite who would opt to operate under his 
political orbit.  
 
Whereas the first decade after independence was very favorable to capital 
accumulation due to a growing international economy, the same was not the case 
when Moi took power in 1978. Even though the second half of the 1970’s 
registered economic growth in aggregate terms, there was a growing concern 
about rising unemployment and worsening conditions of the urban working class 
against the background of a population growth rate that remained one of the 
highest in the world (4.1 %). The consequences of the uneven economic 
development inherited from colonialism and fostered by the Kenyatta regime were 
becoming rather visible as Kenya approached the third decade of formal 
independence.  
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 It was thus becoming apparent that the Moi regime would have to address multiple 
centers of discontent as opposed to the regime it had replaced. As economic 
growth declined under the heavy weight of corruption, public mismanagement and 
a declining world economy, growing discontent had become commonplace as 
evidenced by the reemergence of the trade unions which had been skillfully 
muzzled during Kenyatta’s leadership. The prospects that political instability 
could be the logical result of rising unemployment, declining wages for the urban 
working class and continued impoverishment of the peasantry was becoming a 
primary concern for international capital that had large investments in the Kenyan 
economy. 
 
By the early late 1980’s when the movement for change started gaining 
momentum, the realities of the political developments in Kenya had changed and 
few could still argue as during the height of the ‘Kenya debate’ in the early 1980’s 
that the option of a capitalist growth and liberal democracy was viable. The 
evidence of a crisis was too visible to be ignored by any observer. But many still 
clung to the notion that the course of a stable capitalist growth on which stability 
could rest was perverted by what in political jargon had become known as “Moi’s 
kleptocracy (authoritarian rule predicated on greed and corruption) and that his 
removal would pave the way for a democratic transition. This was the position of 
many Western governments under whose political axis the mainstream opposition 
operated. The United States, Kenya’s most visible cold war ally mandated its 
ambassador Smith Hempstone-a Republican appointee and former chief executive 
of a conservative Texas newspaper the Washington times- to oversee the change. 
 
When the opposition to the regime was made formal and overt in 1989, it brought 
together within its ranks diverse social groups with contradictory aspirations 
concerning the unfolding prospect for regime change. The Forum for the 
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Restoration of Democracy (FORD) which at once became the political home of all 
the social forces that had mobilized in reaction to Moi’s repressive rule was a 
combination of social classes with divergent and contradictory tendencies. As a 
united front, it immediately struck a cord with the wide discontentment among the 
unemployed, the urban working class, middle class professionals, and the rural 
peasantry clamoring for change after years of misrule. But FORD’s leadership also 
brought together social groups that had formed the core of the original KANU 
during the anti-colonial campaign.  
 
The dominantly ethnic Kikuyu capitalist class that had been marginalized by 
Moi’s regime and a section that had remained in government at his pleasure saw 
the political opening as an important opportunity for recapturing the state 
machinery. Political fate quickly dictated that this group gravitates towards the 
two decade long agitation represented by Oginga Odinga who after being sidelined 
by the two regimes came to embody the dominantly Luo middle class’ claim to 
state power invoking ‘ethnic persecution’. 
 
In the years after the fallout with the Kenyatta regime, Odinga’s radical 
nationalism whose tone set KPU’s political agenda advocated land reform and 
opposed what was seen as Kenyatta’s attempt to institutionalize inequalities 
inherited from the colonial rule in the transition to independence. His inclusion in 
the emerging opposition restored the pre-independence Luo-Kikuyu alliance and 
with it, a partial reading of a radical agenda which had given KANU its appeal as 
a mass movement in its anti-colonial campaign. Odinga’s post-colonial 
oppositional political posture however stood in contrast to those of the former 
beneficiaries of state patronage which a predominantly Kikuyu section of the 
opposition in FORD constituted, and with whom he was now forging an alliance.  
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The above marriage of convenience made the opposition broad enough to appeal 
to disenfranchised social groups yearning for change in the face of grim poverty, 
rising unemployment and general insecurity as a result of public corruption and 
mismanagement. This explains the enthusiasm with which FORD was greeted in 
those regions that had largely fallen outside Moi’s system of disproportionate 
favoritism. But the amorphous character of the emerging opposition was also a 
double edged sword. The conflicting class and personal interests of its members 
was a potential cause for disintegration, a prospect which Moi counted on and 
waited for patiently. 
 
When Keneth Matiba and Charles Rubia broke tradition with the hitherto style of 
covert opposition by publicly calling for multiparty politics at the prompting of the 
American Ambassador Smith Hempstone, a large section of the Kikuyu business 
establishment woke up to their call before the two were promptly detained. While 
in detention, their agitation was given voice by a growing number of radical 
individuals from the legal profession, the church and close business associates 
largely drawn from their ethnic Kikuyu community. With Matiba and Rubia in 
detention, Odinga assumed the leadership of the opposition at the urging of radical 
individuals mainly from the legal profession and academia who had become 
known as the ‘young Turks’. When the regime seemed to be losing ground under 
the blitz of FORD agitation, a section of the Kikuyu propertied power elite from 
the Kenyatta era who had hitherto remained in KANU staged a walkout.  
 
The old political establishment retained by Moi as to enlist ethnic Kikuyu support 
had remained in KANU and initially joined Moi in his opposition to multiparty 
politics, with Kibaki arguing in his much remembered speech that “Fighting for 
multiparty was like cutting a mugumo tree (a huge trunk tropical tree) with a razor 
blade” (re-quoted in The Daily Nation 16, Feb. 2001). But when Moi and KANU 
seemed besieged, the group hurriedly moved from the party in a bid not to be 
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caught on the wrong side and formed the Democratic Party (DP) under Kibaki’s 
leadership. The stage was set for a classic class struggle for state control and a 
reenactment of the political struggle that saw the Original KANU split after 
decolonization. 
 
The ethnic Kikuyu propertied class that had coalesced around Matiba and Rubia in 
FORD had no reason to be excited over Odinga’s reputation as a radical 
nationalist who had consistently called for egalitarianism in his almost two and a 
half decade long opposition to the two regimes. But if the changing international 
political climate after the cold war had narrowed down the ideological divide-real 
and imagined-among the different contenders to state power, it had done nothing 
to minimize the open suspicion held by the influential Kikuyu business elite  that 
Odinga’s leadership might not be compatible with their long term political and 
economic power calculations. Having been confined two the periphery by the two 
regimes, the prospect of Odinga using state power upon becoming president to 
sore up his predominantly Luo political power base was to this social group more 
than an academic issue. 
 
While Matiba was recovering at a London hospital following his release from 
detention, fear of schism in the newly founded opposition party remained as could 
be interpreted from his conspicuous silence over high as he persistently what role 
he intended to play upon his return. But when he did finally return, the fragile 
unity disintegrated as he declined to acknowledge Odinga’s leadership of the 
opposition. A united opposition had disintegrated under the heavy weight of social 
class contradictions and personal power ambitions of its leadership, and Moi could 
now face a fragmented opposition for which he had long drawn out the process in 
anticipation. 
 
 47
3.3 After the Elections: Electoral Transition without Democratic 
Transformation 
 
After KANU won the elections and Moi retained political power with a minority 
vote, it became obvious that the struggle for state control would continue in other 
subtle, if not altogether violent forms that could even overwhelm the weakened 
state. One of the reasons given by the Moi regime for opposing multiparty politics 
was that it would lead to ethnic conflict, and in order to prove this right, Moi and 
his close lieutenants soared up ethnic animosity by calling for the expulsion from 
the Rift Valley the Kikuyus and the Luos who had settled in that region after 
independence. The state inspired violence that became known as the ‘ethnic 
clashes’ continued well into the period after multiparty elections where Moi 
continued with his system of reward and punishment of political friends and foes 
respectively. When the dust finally settled down, the clashes had claimed about 
1,000 lives and Moi was back armed with a new mandate to extend state 
protection to both himself and his close allies like Biwott and Ntimama whose 
hands were clearly visible in the state sanctioned ethnic violence. Kenyans braced 
for a new form of authoritarianism under multiparty ‘democracy’. 
 
Looked at from the social class perspective I have outlined above, it seemed rather 
logical that the new Moi regime should use its electoral victory to preserve the 
special status its members had acquired through their thirteen year old patronage 
of the machinery of the state. This was demonstrated in the protracted war that 
followed between the new regime and its creditors, mainly the World Bank and 
the international monetary fund whose attempts to privatize certain sectors of 
economy threatened the interests of the business elite built around Moi and his 
Key allies. In the meantime, Moi held out financial inducement and state 
patronage to members of the opposition who would defect to KANU. By 1997, a 
sizeable number of opposition politicians who had defected from KANU for 
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instrumental other than ideological reasons had responded to Moi’s overtures and 
rejoined his new government. 
 
In the by-elections called as a result of the defection of sitting MPs to the 
government, KANU won eight of the thirteen seats and strengthened its position in 
parliament. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of opposition members had fallen 
from 88 to 76 while KANU had a total of 122 MPs (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 
569). Proximity to state power regardless of who held that power seemed to be the 
guiding principle in changing party affiliation thereby calling into question the 
very notion that multiparty politics in Kenya would generate stable political 
institutions and cleavages. 
 
It was becoming apparent to many that multiparty politics had failed to make a 
complete break from the authoritarian tendencies of the last three decades. The 
new Moi regime had incorporated some of the features of the liberal democracy 
ideal, the most outstanding of which is elections-in such a way as to embrace its 
form without substance. But the most problematic agenda looked at from the 
perspective of the social class antagonism adopted here remained the question and 
equation of the transformation of the Kenyan economy to address the issues of 
landlessness, rising unemployment and widespread social inequality which posed 
a potential threat to political stability. This calls for a brief reflection over some of 
the issues raised in the Kenya debate which I highlighted above. 
 
It is tempting, looking at Kenya’s political development to concur with those who 
pointed out in the Kenya debate that a combination of the structure of the colonial 
economy (inherited intact in the transition to independence), a predatory state and 
the monopoly power of international capital constituted a hindrance to Kenya’s 
long term political stability. The thrust of this argument rested on the contention 
that the social class which became known as the Kenyan comprador bourgeoisie or 
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simply as the Kenyan capitalist class stood in the way of economic transformation 
that could reduce social inequality which had become a central feature of the post-
colonial Kenyan reality.  
 
Using the state as an instrument of control and capital accumulation, the new 
social class opposed economic measures such as land redistribution which could 
reduce the population pressure on land but which was not compatible with large 
scale commercial agriculture which this class dominated in alliance with 
international capital. The equation was seen as further complicated by the needs of 
international capital whose investment priorities was seen as geared towards the 
export market leading to unproductive use of national resources. The Kenyan 
debacle seen from this point is the logical consequence of this distorted 
development. 
 
The neo-liberal response to the economic and political crisis in Kenya as in other 
sub-Saharan African states during the first half of the last decade was to focus on 
the state and corruption as the major obstacle to economic development in their 
thesis that the path of capitalist economic development was indeed feasible in the 
absence of market imperfections and an authoritarian state. International financial 
institutions moved fast to link what became known as ‘good governance’ to the 
demand for market liberalization. If the state distorted development by imposing 
trade restrictions, subsidies, price control and other measures from which ‘rent 
seeking’ public officials benefited according to this neo-liberal phraseology, then 
it logically followed that the remedy lies in deregulation, meaning discarding state 
intervention so as to give primacy to the logic of the free market. The demands of 
liberalization simultaneously call for a democratization strategy to curb state 
power because the liberal economy requires a liberal state according to this 
reasoning. 
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In taking stock of the Kenya debate in the second half of the 1990’s, Colin Leys 
(Leys 1996: 143-163) whose seminal work set the tone of the debate on Kenya’s 
political and economic development pointed out what he saw as the contradictions 
of Kenya’s capitalist development and the question of political stability in the long 
run. Leys, who had moved from dependency theory in its original formulation held 
the question of liberal democratic development open and not foreclosed as he had 
originally argued but spelt out what he saw as the challenges facing the prospect of 
such a development. In view of Kenya’s fast growing population (somehow 
mitigated today by the AIDS epidemic), he saw radical land reform as 
indispensable in providing subsistence for the new work force, productive 
employment in the agricultural sector and expanding the domestic market for the 
local industry thereby reducing the risk of political instability stemming from 
social deprivation. But this solution was seen as untenable as the same land 
remained the most secure basis for capital investment by the social class that held 
state power. Forgoing the privilege of capital accumulation for the landed elite in 
the regime would have been unthinkable. This foreclosed the question of radical 
land redistribution. 
 
The way forward thus-in view of the impasse over the growing pressure of labor 
on land due to vested social class interest-was selective legislation that promoted 
rapid industrialization that could enhance the manufacturing industry’s capacity to 
compete in the world markets, a path reminiscent of the one that had been 
followed by the newly industrialized states (NICs). But once again this option was 
seen as caught up in the conflict between indigenous Kenyan capital and the needs 
of manufacturing industry which in the words of Roger Southall is “dominated by 
an Indian bourgeoisie which although formally Kenyan, is politically insecure and is still 
regarded as essentially foreign” (Southall 1999:94). This implied incongruence 
between the short term interests of the social classes that held political power and 
those of the manufacturing industry largely in the hands of Kenyan Asians and 
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multinational corporations. The consequence of this has been that this segment of 
the domestic capitalist class has never seen the need to adopt measures like import 
restrictions, wage reduction or tax waivers to stimulate industrial growth. 
 
The above contradictions remain central to the question of liberal democratic 
development in Kenya which underpins multiparty competition. On close scrutiny 
however, it remains doubtful that such a development could be realized even if the 
domestic capitalist class was to assume ownership of the manufacturing sector and 
legislate positively to promote its growth. Economic nationalism alluded to above 
appears rather remote within the context of the international neo-liberal 
arrangement policed by international financial institutions. Furthermore, this thesis 
presupposes a large internal market and an ever expanding world economy 
receptive to new states. This is far from being the reality of world capitalist 
development as demonstrated by the current trade antagonism among the major 
trading blocks represented by the United States, European Union, Japan and 
China. As it is, the question of a stable liberal economic growth for Kenya remains 
shrouded in serious doubts, pronunciations to the contrary notwithstanding.  
 
In light of the of the social class competition for state control outlined above, the 
stalemate that ensued in Kenya’s democratic transformation process after the 1992 
multiparty elections becomes explainable. The ancient regim continued its hold on 
political power and opposed reforms that threatened to undermine the privileged 
status the power elite had acquired through the monopoly of state control. This 
explains the tug of war that continued between Moi’s power elite and international 
financial institutions culminating in the suspension of financial disbursements in 
the run to the second election in 1997. The euphoria that greeted multiparty 
politics started to wane as its outcome was failing to translate into democratic 
transformation that could address the economics of social inequality whose 
manifestation remained declining economic growth rate, high unemployment, low 
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living standards, increasing crime rate and other social ills which threatened 
political stability. 
 
 Beneath the facade of political pluralism, competition for state control among the 
social elite seeking to consolidate social class interests and a demand for a liberal 
state to protect the interests of international capital was threatening to aggravate 
social inequality. The reintroduction of political competition at the beginning of 
the decade as could be readily admitted had not yielded the much the promised 
economic dividends as Kenya approached the close of the decade. There were 
worrying signs reflected in growing public apathy that the Kenyan state was 
failing to make a break from the past. As long as Moi continued his tight grips on 
political power which he retained after the second elections in 1997, these 
contradictions remained camouflaged in the widespread contention that his 
departure from the scene would pave way for a democratic transformation. But as 
the next chapter highlights, personal morality was far from being the central 
problem of Kenya’s democratic transformation stalemate.                                                         
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The 2002 Election and the Exit of the Moi Regime: Third Time Lucky or 
Third Time Doomed? 
 
The period after the first election witnessed a general stalemate between the 
governing elite of the Moi regime on one hand and the established political parties 
and other social groups on the other. The mood was becoming less euphoric as 
Kenya approached the second election 1n 1997 amidst deepening political and 
economic crisis. Many observers were ready to admit that far from opening a 
political avenue towards a transition to liberal democratic development, the 
elected regime under Moi had appropriated the forms of liberal democracy but 
reneged on every substance in the way of democratic transformation. The 
widespread assumption made at the advent of political pluralism that the aftermath 
of multiparty politics would be characterized by democratic gains gave way to 
open acknowledgement that Kenya was in a state of what John W. Harbeson 
called “arrested democratic consolidation” (Harbeson 1998 p 161). 
 
 After almost four and a half years after the first multiparty elections, the newly 
elected regime refused to acknowledge the opposition, bribed a section of it to 
defect to the ruling party and stood up to the demands of international financial 
institutions seeking to privatize sectors of the economy on which its members 
relied to exercise patronage. The ruling party KANU had launched a revival and 
the towering authoritarian figure of Moi loomed larger than any political 
institution associated with liberal democracy. A shadow of despair was slowly 
descending on the robust claims made on behalf of political pluralism at the 
beginning of the decade.  
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The second multiparty elections held in 1997 approached amidst deep seated 
political apathy about the chances of removing the Moi elite from political control. 
The mainstream opposition in parliament teamed up with other social groups 
outside parliament to demand level playing ground in the lead to the elections. 
Social groups mainly drawn from the church and the legal profession formed a 
national convention executive council (NCEC) to push for constitutional reforms 
that would curtail the far reaching powers of the presidency and accord due 
recognition to political opposition. In a predictable fashion, the regime refused to 
heed the call from the NCEC and when the group held a rally which the 
government considered illegal on 7 July 1997, riot police descended on the rally 
held at a park in Nairobi and violently dispersed the political gathering.  
 
Fearing political turmoil as elections approached, Western governments stepped 
up the pressure on the regime and the international monetary fund once again 
suspended $ 220 million in credit. This was followed by the World Bank and other 
bilateral financial institutions and in a tactical maneuver as before, the regime 
relented to demands for minimum constitutional reforms before the elections 
thereby engaging the opposition for the first time since the first elections held in 
1991. The game of wits continued as the most prominent feature of Kenya’s 
multiparty process.  
 
In a bid to dilute the powers of the NCEC which rested outside parliament, the 
regime insisted that parliament become the forum for the negotiations and not the 
National Constitutional Assembly which was the deliberating organ of the NCEC. 
This gave birth to the Inter-parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) which negotiated 
the minimal reforms prior to the 1997 elections. Moi had once gain taken the 
political initiative from the opposition by bringing back the dissent to parliament 
where KANU exercised control. The IPPG did however converge on the need for 
basic reforms to enable the opposition and KANU an equal footing in the coming 
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elections. They also agreed on the establishment of a constitutional-review 
commission after the elections to deliberate on far reaching reforms on 
fundamental issues like powers of the presidency, electoral reform and devolution 
of power to local authorities.  
 
The regime had just conceded the minimum it needed to whether the storm of 
criticism from its external backers and in the subsequent elections conducted in 
December 1997, the Moi regime retained power as expected, garnering 41% of the 
total votes as opposed to the 36% secured in 1992. Kibaki became second (31%) 
in the absence of Keneth Matiba whose FORD-Asili boycotted the elections while 
Raila Odinga secured third place (19%) with his National Development Party. Moi 
was back in power after facing a much more fragmented opposition than he did in 
1992 but the countdown to his exit was also beginning to loom in the horizons. 
 
In the period after the second election, much of the political posturing by both the 
opposition and the regime came to be conducted against the background of Moi’s 
impending exit as the constitution barred him from contesting a third term. Kenya 
stood at crossroads as the realignment of social forces began in the contest for 
state control. The regime did make good its promise of establishing a 
constitutional-review commission to deliberate on the powers of the presidency 
and other reforms but the opposition saw sinister motives as Moi sought to control 
the process by putting it under a parliamentary select committee. 
 
 Apprehension prevailed that Moi could circumvent retirement by giving himself a 
third term in the new constitution. The realignment of social classes continued 
however with its ethnic implications and after a period of parliamentary 
cooperation with KANU, Raila Odinga merged his National Development Party 
with Moi’s KANU in what looked like a tactical move to secure Moi’s backing for 
the presidency. The power struggle that would ensue later with Raila as a tenant in 
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Moi’s house spelt the end of KANU’s hold on power since independence from 
colonial rule. 
 
The merger between Raila Odinga’s NDP and Moi’s KANU, not only brought 
together two seemingly strange bedfellows-in that Moi had always been in power 
while Raila in opposition and even imprisoned by the regime for almost a decade-
but also two social groups with contradictory social class aspirations. The KANU 
house into which the NDP moved constituted mainly the new commercial and 
business class bred under Moi’s state patronage and drawn heavily from his 
Kalenjin ethnic community. To it was apendixed a section of the ethnic Kikuyu 
business class on whom the Moi regime still relied for support. The NDP under 
Raila on the other hand embodied the personal and class ambitions of the 
predominantly Luo elite whose access to state control had been blocked following 
Kenyatta’s purge of radical nationalists after independence.  
 
The NDP’s merger with KANU and what was construed as Raila Odinga’s 
gravitation towards Moi as a stepping stone to state house was thus viewed with 
suspicion by both the old and the new beneficiaries of state patronage in and 
outside the ruling party, especially Kibaki’s DP where the majority of the old 
guards from the Kenyatta era had found a home. Both had no reason to believe 
that a regime with no economic basis in the wealth accumulation of the two post 
independence regimes would safeguard their long term economic interests. The 
silent war of attrition lasted until Moi finally settled on Kenyatta’s son Uhuru as 
KANU’s candidate for the presidency thereby making overt the jostling for state 
control that had until then remained latent.  
 
When Moi seemed unrelenting in his efforts to mastermind the transition in his 
favor by handing KANU presidential nomination to his chosen candidate Uhuru 
Kenyatta, Raila Odinga who had been elevated to become a cabinet minister and 
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KANU secretary general decamped from the party in October 2001.Two 
seemingly opposite and irreconcilable political calculations had backfired against 
the background of conflicting social and personal class claim to state control. 
Moi’s attempt to get the NDP and Raila Odinga to support Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
candidacy as a way of ensuring continuity was simply not compatible with the 
NDP’s claim to state house on the basis of exclusion from access to the state by 
the two post-colonial regimes. In the event, Raila and the NDP walked away from 
KANU followed by other disgruntled elite within the party seriously undermining 
the regime’s ability to control the outcome of the impending elections. 
 
 Ironically enough, the group that decamped from Moi’s KANU found itself 
seeking alliance with the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) which had brought 
together Kibaki’s DP, FORD-Kenya and Ngilu’s National Party of Kenya 
precisely to act as a bulwark against the NDP-KANU alliance as election 
approached. Sensing defeat, the Moi regime launched intense political maneuvers 
to woo the splinter group back but with the exception of Mudavadi (who crossed 
back and was appointed vice president), the group stood firm and formed the 
National Rainbow Coalition. The same month, the splinter group coalesced around 
Kibaki’s leadership after intense negotiation with the NAK and NARC was born. 
 
The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was the unintended political outcome of 
the jockeying for state control among different social groups which had each 
adopted different routes in their power calculations as Moi’s constitutionally 
stipulated retirement drew near. The regime’s primary concern remained a 
transition that would not undo the economic power base its elite had developed via 
state control. This explains the discomfort exhibited by Moi’s elite over Raila 
Odinga’s overtures which was seen as an attempt to edge closer to the center of 
power as Moi’s departure grew near. But his National Democratic Party also 
embodied the aspirations of a predominantly Luo social elite excluded from state 
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control by the two post-colonial regimes. The fear that his ascendance to power 
could undo the gains of the social classes of the two post colonial regimes 
remained real. 
 
  Moi’s gravitation towards Uhuru Kenyatta was thus a carefully designed political 
gimmick aimed at ensuring a transition that would hand over political power back 
to the predominantly Kikuyu social elite from whose hands he had wrestled state 
control, but whom he now felt would be a secure basis for a government that 
would protect his Kalenjin centered alliance. But the formation of NARC changed 
the above logic as Moi once again lost the political initiative to a formidable 
opposition in whose face traditional tools of political trickeries like election 
rigging or intimidation could only cause public uproar. Without completely losing 
control, the Moi regime seemed t be adjusting to the new reality. 
 
Despite their divergent personal and social class ambitions rooted in Kenya’s 
political economy, the united opposition against Moi’s KANU was held together 
by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that pledged to speed up the stalled 
constitutional review process and introduce a parliamentary as opposed to an 
executive system based on the principle of power division. This opened the way 
for a string of influential offices to be allocated to the leading members of the 
assembled opposition groups. This postponed the potential for a pre-election 
power struggle that could tear the front apart and hand over victory to KANU. The 
widespread distrust among the strange bedfellows was however demonstrated by 
the fact that the MOU was signed in an advocate’s office even though it was a 
political pact based on a common political platform. The contents were also kept 
secret, ostensibly to undercut the prospect of Moi using the power sharing deal to 
lure disgruntled opposition elite back to KANU. The National Rainbow Coalition 
had taken shape as election drew closer. 
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Concerned that the besieged Moi elite should not resort to desperate tactics that 
could negatively impact on political stability, the United States-the regime’s most 
principal ally during the cold war and after-initiated a campaign aimed at assuring 
Moi immunity from prosecution in return for stepping down peacefully. In 
November 2002, Moi was invited to the white House by the Bush administration 
to be reminded to step down gracefully, and the man whose regime symbolized 
anything but the protection of human rights found himself addressing an audience 
at Jimmy Carter’s human rights foundation. The US administration had come to 
the conclusion that granting immunity to the elite of the Moi regime was the only 
ticket to stability in the shaky transition and subsequently prevailed on the 
opposition to embrace the theme. A transition was in the offing for Kenya where 
room for change was contracting under a new political entity called NARC. 
 
4.1 The Exit of the Moi Regime and the Euphoria of Democratic Change 
 
On the 27 of December 2002, an opposition united under the umbrella of the 
National Rainbow Alliance (NARC) successfully challenged KANU’s power 
monopoly of many decades in an election whose outcome was more or less 
determined beforehand. The National Rainbow Coalition garnered 62% of the 
presidential votes, beating Moi’s favored candidate Uhuru Kenyatta whose KANU 
gained 31% of the votes. The NARC beat KANU in similar fashion in 
parliamentary elections capturing 125 of the 224 seats. The depleted KANU 
managed 64 seats in the post Moi parliament leaving the smaller parties in control 
of the remaining 21elected parliamentary seats as reflected in the figure shown in 
table 4.0 on the next page. As one Kenyan analyst remarked, the NARC victory 
“was the most significant political event in the history of Kenya since British colonial 
rule formally ended in December 1963”. (Ndegwa 2002: 145) 
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Table 4.0 
The results of the 2003 presidential elections depicting the landslide victory for 
the NARC  
 
Province Mwai Kibaki, 
NARC 
Uhuru 
Kenyatta, 
KANU 
Simeon 
Nyachae, 
FORD-People 
James 
Orengo, SDP 
David Ngethe 
Waweru, Chama 
cha Uma 
Nairobi 76.49 % 20.78 % 2.40 % 0.24 % 0.08 % 
Coast 62.78 % 33.36 % 3.21 % 0.42 % 0.23 % 
North 
Eastern 
28.09 % 67.06 % 4.55 % 0.24 % 0.06 % 
Eastern 72.51 % 26.17 % 0.76 % 0.34 % 0.22 % 
Central 68.96 % 30.26 % 0.44 % 0.14 % 0.20 % 
Rift Valley 43.24 % 53.26 % 3.13 % 0.27 % 0.11 % 
      
Western 76.31 % 21.54 % 1.37 % 0.52 % 0.28 % 
Nyanza 61.39 % 7.60 % 29.75 % 1.13 % 0.13 % 
Total 62.20 % 31.32 % 5.89 % 0.42 % 0.17 %
Source:NORDEM report 07/2003 
 
 
The Moi regime, long regarded as the only obstacle to liberal democratic 
development by many after the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991 had 
been relegated to the periphery by a united opposition. As observed by Frank 
Holmquist (Holmquist 2002) in his post election analysis, the public mood at the 
handover ceremony at Uhuru Park in Nairobi witnessed to the euphoric 
expectation of change that accompanied the electoral transition The public in 
attendance shared a conviction that a new era was unfolding in Kenya as conveyed 
by the opposition’s Kiswahili song “Yote yawezekana bila Moi” (everything is 
possible without Moi) which filled the air accompanied by chants of thief, thief as 
Moi tried to speak. It was as Ndegwa points out in his analysis “a victory ten years 
delayed”(Ndegwa 2002 p 148). 
 
The election result and Moi’s departure from the political scene as Ajulu puts it 
received international accolade as “a model for peaceful democratic change” and a 
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panacea for liberal democratic development which could be emulated by other 
states in the region (Ajulu 2003: 1). There seemed to be an overwhelming 
consensus that the march to liberal democratic development perverted by the Moi 
regime was put back on the political truck by the election of the NARC to power. 
Long seen as the hallmarks of the Moi regime, corruption occasioned by what in 
liberal terminology became known as the ‘rent seeking state’ (Mauro 1997,  The 
world bank 1997) could now be tackled under the NARC leadership. President 
Kibaki became the first African head of state honored by a state visit to 
Washington by the Bush administration. Even analysts who expressed some 
reservations over this post election euphoria like Frank Holmquist nonetheless 
maintained that “there is no question about the political will of the Kibaki government 
to fight corruption” (Holmquist 2002 p 2003). The contention that the hour of 
democratic change had arrived was simply overwhelming. 
 
The above optimism also shared by the majority of the Kenyan citizenry could be 
said to reflect the yearning for change after decades of mismanagement of the state 
resulting in economic downturn, corruption, a personalized bureaucracy, increased 
crime rate, widespread social inequality and a near total collapse of public 
infrastructure. The NARC victory was held high as the obvious antithesis to the 
ancien regim in the rediscovered liberal democratic development faith that reigned 
in the period immediately after the elections. The opposition had finally prevailed 
in its third attempt to remove Moi and restore democratic governance; “third time 
lucky?” posed one analyst, on the prospects of Kenya’s stalled democratic 
transition (Ndegwa 2002: 145).  
 
The opposition might have been lucky in their third attempt which saw Moi 
relinquish state control but was the stalled democratic transformation process third 
time lucky or was it third time doomed?. As is becoming increasingly evident 
now, the NARC victory was by no means an assurance that substantive democratic 
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transformation around which the aspirations of the majority of the Kenyans 
converged in their enthusiastic support for change would be realized. After 
decades of political repression and economic stagnation resulting in widespread 
poverty, unemployment, increased social inequality and general insecurity, few 
imagined that these developments could resurface in the post Moi Kenya, but 
resurface they did. 
 
The alliance that put an end to KANU’s almost forty year hold on political power 
and President Moi’s twenty four years at the helm, was as Barkan pointed out “ a 
coalition of convenience, united more by what it opposed than by what it actually stands 
for” (Barkan 2002: 92). Looked at from the perspective of social class conflict in 
the competition for state control as a basis for capital accumulation I outlined 
above, the uneasy tranquility which obtained in the NARC was the lull before the 
storm. It was obvious that there would be a changing balance of social forces 
among the different social groups in the struggle for state control that would ensue 
after the elections. The direction of the stalled democratic process would in this 
case be determined by which combination of social classes would manage to assert 
their authority on state control. It was owing to this that apprehension hanged over 
the pre-election agreement among the parties which undertook to abolish 
executive presidency and turn the Kenyan political system to parliamentarism after 
the elections. 
 
But observers who feared a repeat of the stalemate that had hitherto paralyzed 
Kenya’s democratic transformation did not have to wait for long. No sooner had 
the dust settled after the euphoric victory celebrations did a war of attrition ensue 
among the NARC’s constituent groups in the struggle for state control. The latent 
conflict suppressed for political convenience erupted at its most expected 
epicenter. Immediately after assuming the presidency, Kibaki under whose 
Democratic Party (DP) the “former Kikuyu elite and Kikuyu big business” (Throup& 
 63
Hornsby 1998) had consolidated itself started a gradual movement away from the 
agreement (memorandum of understanding or MOU) that had glued together the 
different parties in NARC prior to the elections. The government backtracked on 
the pre-election agreement providing for equal distribution of cabinet posts 
between Kibaki’s NAK and the LDP of Raila Odinga. The ball had been set 
rolling in the struggle for state control and a continued stalemate loomed in 
Kenya’s stalled democratic process. 
 
If Kenya’s history is anything to go by, then the predominantly Kikuyu business 
class heavily represented in Kibaki’s DP had no reason to be comfortable about 
any political move to water down the powers of the presidency. Their dominance 
in Kenyan politics had been aided precisely by state protection under Kenyatta’s 
stewardship. They had watched this disappear upon Moi’s ascendance to power 
and his subsequent tilt of the balance of state patronage to his ethnic Kalenjin and 
other minority groups which formed his power base. With Moi’s regime out and 
Kibaki in state house, it was only logical that this group should seek to revive what 
Holmquist called “the Kikuyu dominance of the Kenyatta presidency” (Holmquist 
2002: 205). Such an objective was simply not compatible with a parliamentary 
democracy which left the president with no executive powers to dispense 
patronage. Once in power, Kibaki’s ruling clique found themselves opposing the 
very constitutional reforms they had demanded while challenging Moi’s 
presidency.  
 
The pre-election memorandum of understanding signed among NARC’s 
constituent parties had also promised the post of prime minister to Raila Odinga’s 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This further heightened the antagonism as Raila 
Odinga’s predominantly Luo based LDP staked its claim to political power on the 
basis of having been denied access to state control by the two past regimes. It 
remained highly improbable that he would have, as a Prime minister built his 
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political power base around the old Kikuyu capitalist class that sought to reassert 
their hegemony after a period of exclusion from control of the state machinery by 
the Moi regime. The social elite around Kibaki, painfully aware of this sought to 
strengthen their hold on state control immediately after the elections. As 
Holmquist further observes “It was evident from the early weeks of the regime that all 
prominent people in state house as well as half a dozen or so informal advisers to the 
president, were from the Kikuyu and related ethnic groups” (Ibid: 204). The first 
visible casualty in the unfolding renewal of the stalemate in the democratic 
transformation became the stalled constitutional review process. 
 
4.2 The Renewal of the Stalemate in the Democratic Transformation Process 
 
When parliament reconvened after the elections under the new government, the 
alignment of social forces seemed to go against the grains of the unity of the 
opposition that had seen NARC defeat KANU. Party affiliations that had defined 
the political terrain in the lead to the election started vanishing as different social 
groups began a process of redefining their positions in relation to the power center. 
In the struggle for control of the parliamentary select committee (PSC) that was to 
oversee the stalled constitutional reform process, the power elite that had formed 
around Kibaki’s presidency broke with the pre-election NARC consensus and 
opposed Raila Odinga’s election as chairman of the parliamentary committee.  
 
In a move widely read as an attempt by the new power elite to revive the old 
ethnic Kikuyu political establishment of the Kenyatta period and further stall the 
constitutional reform process, Kibaki and his inner circle fronted Paul Muite to 
take over the chairmanship of the PSC committee even though his party SAFINA 
was not part of the ruling NARC coalition. Like many of the individuals in 
Kibaki’s DP, the Nairobi based lawyer had come to prominence during the 
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Kenyatta era where he “prospered from lucrative briefs from government and 
parastatals” (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 57) before joining politics. 
As chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee, Muite has subsequently 
supervised the Kibaki government’s turn about on the constitution making 
process. The NARC remained a coalition in name but state control tilted after the 
elections in favor of Kibaki’s Democratic Party. The conventional division 
between the opposition and the government virtually evaporated as the real 
dividing line now went between the former Kikuyu centered business 
establishment of the Kenyatta regime now consolidated under the DP and opposed 
to power devolution, and the LDP which continues to advocate for constitutional 
reform to mitigate this group’s control of the state.  
 
A deadlock has since ensued between the Kibaki led section of the NARC 
government and the constitutional conference whose membership is drawn from 
regional representatives, social groups and parliamentarians. As during the Moi 
regime, the constitutional review commission of Kenya (CRCK) is meeting 
resistance from government stonewalling of reforms in order to maintain its hold 
on centralized political power. This tag of war assumed tragic proportions in the 
shooting and killing under mysterious circumstances of a University lecturer who 
chaired the ‘technical committee on power devolution’ of the CRCK. Many saw 
the government’s hand in the killing and NARC’s Raila Odinga dubbed it political 
murder. The suspects charged with the murder have since been acquitted by the 
state. 
 
In a move reminiscent of events after Moi’s second election in 1997, the Kibaki 
government is battling to wrestle control from the CRCK and return the 
constitutional review process to parliament where it has control. After a prolonged 
period of unsuccessful attempt to influence the final draft especially the 
contentious issue of reducing the powers of the presidency, this group wants 
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parliament to amend the draft before it is adopted. But this move is opposed by the 
LDP and MPs drawn from other parties in parliament who see it as an effort by the 
government to hijack the process and subvert its basis as ‘a people driven 
constitution making process’.  
 
Fearing a crisis within the NARC government as a result of the internal conflict 
over the constitutional review process, Kibaki’s ruling elite diluted the pre-
election basis of the NARC coalition by appointing members of the opposition to 
the cabinet. Members of opposition parties found their ways into ministerial 
appointments in what Kibaki dubbed “government of national unity”. Important 
however in this move, was the inclusion of Njega Karume, known for his 
prominence in the ethnic outfit GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru & Akamba) 
movement formed to agitate for continued hegemony of the Kikuyu capitalist elite 
as Kenyatta’s era neared its end. He remained with Moi as others deserted and was 
elected to parliament on a KANU ticket. But in June 2004, Kibaki incorporated 
“Kenya’s most successful capitalist and GEMA’s former chief executive” (Throup & 
Hornsby 1998: 341) and made him minister for ‘special projects’. The move 
further underlined attempts by the Kibaki regime to build the basis of its political 
support around the old Kikuyu capitalist establishment from the Kenyatta era.  
 
The inclusion of members of the opposition in the cabinet has blurred the picture 
of the institutional arrangements of liberal democracy for which the Kenyan state 
was supposed to be destined to at the advent of multiparty politics. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the institutions are vanishing as alliances shift to reflect the 
underlying social class and personal interests in the struggle for state control. The 
political constellation that saw NARC gain political power has virtually vanished 
making it rather difficult to discern who is in government or the opposition. It 
becomes difficult to visualize institutional stability so much touted by the 
proponents of liberal democracy.  
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 Two and half years after coming to power in 2003, the constitutional review 
process is caught up in a stalemate similar to the one that saw the process stall 
during the Moi regime. All indications point to a continuation of the prolonged 
stalemate as demonstrated by the present attempt by the government to change the 
composition of the PSC and replace LDP members of parliament by other MPs 
sympathetic to the position of the Kibaki section of the NARC. Under the 
circumstances it is highly difficult to sustain the almost revolutionary euphoria 
that greeted Moi’s departure and the NARC’s assumption of political power. The 
struggle for state control as a basis for capital accumulation and political patronage 
remains at the core of Kenya’s politics as demonstrated by the long standing 
conflict over curtailing the powers of the presidency. A president without 
executive powers remains incompatible with capital accumulation and patronage 
predicated on state intervention. Nothing today indicates that the NARC 
government will relent in its opposition to reforming the state. 
 
4.3 The Resurgence of Corruption in Government and the Predatory State 
 
When the National Rainbow Coalition came to power after the 2002 elections, 
there had been an almost decade long cat and mouse game between international 
financial institutions and the Moi regime. Moi wavered between partially 
implementing the demands of the institutions and partially resisting them when it 
suited his regime to do so. The most contentious issue remained the plundering of 
state resources which actually became intense following the reintroduction of 
multiparty elections which made the Moi regime insecure about its future (Ajulu 
2002: 4). Grand corruption had become commonplace and was epitomized by the 
highly publicized Goldenburg scandal in which top government officials colluded 
to siphon $ 200 million from public coffers ostensibly in export compensation to a 
firm that never exported any gold . The NARC’s victory was thus hailed as the 
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dawn of a new era that would rid the government of corrupt practices. The 
optimism was shared by many including academic analysts as summed up in 
Frank Holmquist’s optimistic pronouncements cited earlier. 
 
The first few months of the post election period saw a variety of hectic activities 
by the NARC government to streamline the operations of anticorruption bodies 
established to curb the menace. This went along with the post cold war neo-liberal 
agenda of both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that 
identifies corruption as the most important obstacle to economic development in 
African countries. Impressed by the verbal commitments from the new regime, the 
two institutions and other international financial institutions in November 2003 
restored economic lending suspended as a result of the Moi regime’s 
intransigence. But the consensus over the anticorruption crusade became a short 
lived honeymoon as it took a new turn soon after the World Bank and the IMF 
resumed lending to the new regime.  
 
In what looked like rumblings from the Moi regime, the government got engaged 
in a tag of war with parliament over the appointment of a former high court judge 
with whom his ruling circle has close personal ties as the head of the Kenya 
Anticorruption Commission (KACC). Despite loud objections from a section of 
parliament, the government stood its ground and went ahead with its nomination. 
Indications were emerging that the government was backtracking in its 
commitment to fight corruption and as demonstrated in the concerted effort to 
compromise the independence of the anticorruption body by appointing 
individuals with whom regime members have close personal ties. There was also 
growing concern over the slow pace of the investigations into the Goldenburg 
scandal. Key individuals adversely mentioned by the commission of inquiry into 
the scandal occupied ministerial positions in the new government raising fears that 
they might never be prosecuted. 
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 After consolidating his political power around his ethnic Kikuyu community and 
other related ethnic groups from around Mount Kenya, corruption reemerged 
earning the Kibaki government the now infamous connotation of “ the Mount 
Kenya Mafia” . The optimism of the immediate post Moi era has taken backstage 
and there is growing appeal to the new regime to confront what has become 
known as the ‘return of grand corruption in government’. The most conspicuous 
however in the string of scandals remains the well known “Anglo Leasing 
scandal” where the ministry of defense and finance attempted to award a 
multimillion tender to a non existent British company supposedly called Anglo 
Leasing.  
 
Even though the money paid in advance to the fake company eventually found its 
way back to state coffers after the scandal was unearthed, the two ministers 
implicated refused to step down and instead directed their ire at the British 
Ambassador who has become increasingly vocal in his criticism of corruption in 
the NARC government. Responding to a barrage of attacks from the government, 
Edward clay in February 2005 presented a list of twenty ‘questionable government 
deals’ as evidence of the resurgence of grand corruption (Daily Nation, February 
3, 2005). This followed a challenge from the government that he should provide 
evidence over his allegations in July 2004 that “corruption had cost the country a 
staggering Kshs 15 billion in just 18 months of President Kibaki’s Presidency”(The 
Standard July 14, 2004). 
 
Despite continued verbal pronouncements about the ‘war on corruption’ by 
members of Kibaki’s inner circle, there is a growing despair that the crusade has 
lost momentum. The cat and mouse game, once a central feature of the Moi 
regime’s dealings with international financial institutions has reemerged as a 
political tactic cherished by the Kibaki regime. This could be read in the recent 
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pronouncements by key regime members like Kiraitu Murungi (the minister for 
constitutional affairs and a powerful figure in the NARC government) that the year 
2005 will be the “year of action” on corruption (The Standard, April 16, 2005).  
Given his spirited defense of the government in the face of increasing evidence of 
corruption and his open opposition to the constitutional reform, many read his 
statement as political trickery coming as it did one week before the consultative 
group meeting between Kenya and its creditors, mainly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
A further development which highlights the apparent reluctance of the NARC 
government to make a break from past practices is the recent resignation the man 
who had been appointed the secretary for ‘ethics and governance’. In a bid to woo 
international creditors back to Kenya, the NARC government named John 
Githongo to spearhead the anticorruption fight. The appointment of the former 
Transparency International official received positive approval as a demonstration 
of the NARC’s commitment to routing corruption. But Githongo’s office placed 
directly under the office of the president as demanded by the World Bank and IMF 
(Oendo & Holmquist 2001: 202) soon found itself at odds with regime officials 
bent on the cult of accumulation under state patronage. After a tag of war which 
saw an attempt to remove his office from the state house, the man who had earned 
the name of the “anticorruption Czar” resigned from the NARC government and 
sought refuge in London. Western government reacted swiftly with both Germany 
and the United States suspending funding of NARC’s anticorruption campaign. 
 
Following the current acknowledgement of the reemergence of corruption in 
government, the post cold war jubilation which greeted multiparty politics is being 
revised to embrace the seemingly opposite hypothesis that ‘corruption might 
undermine’ democratization’.  If the theme of the 1990’s was that multiparty 
politics would herald political accountability and forestall corruption (LeVine 
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1993: 271) which had hitherto plagued states like Kenya, then the current thesis 
as- observed by Szeftel towards the end of the last decade-remains an irony “given 
the claims made for pluralism and the liberal state at the start of this decade” (Szeftel 
1998: 227). The thesis can be interpreted as an ad hoc modification of the liberal 
democracy thesis to accommodate the current pessimism regarding the prospects 
for change and its long term implications for political stability. 
 
Little today suggests that the reintroduction of multiparty politics a in the early 
1990’s signaled the beginning of a new era that would transform the Kenyan state 
and address the problems of economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, social 
inequality and their attendant consequences like increase in crime rate and 
growing public discontent which threaten political stability. Despite the opening 
up of space for political competition, the development of a capitalist system which 
the neo-liberal thesis assumes remains doubtful within the post cold war world 
order. The prospect of the local capitalist elite effecting economic nationalism in 
the global era remains highly problematic. And as I have argued above, the 
extensive economic transformation which such an exercise might require will 
necessarily undermine the state acquired economic privileges enjoyed by the 
current ruling social elite.  
 
There is already increasing evidence that the current regime might lean back to 
authoritarian methods of controlling dissent as popular unrest increases in the face 
of public disillusionment. This is already highlighted in the current attempt by the 
state to control the mass media by seeking to draw ‘guidelines’ on how the news 
media should operate (The Standard, April 30, 2005). The recent arrest of a 
Member of Parliament critical of the government for singing a song that 
supposedly put the president’s wife in bad light (The Standard 14 April, 2005) can 
also be read in a similar way. Revelatory of what might be in store as discontent 
builds up is the attempt to revive the ‘chief’s authority act’ as pronounced by John 
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Michuki, the minister for ‘Internal Security’. The chief’s act was a colonial 
invention aimed at controlling political dissent. It gives local administrative 
officials wide powers including those of proscribing political meetings, arrest, 
detention and restriction of movement. In what is definitely a dramatic turn from 
the principles of democratic governance daily invoked by the NARC government, 
the minister newly stated that the act was “the most visible organ through which the 
executive arm of the government can influence, direct and process public needs” (The 
Standard April 19, 2005) 
 
The opposition might have been lucky in its third attempt at dislodging the Moi 
regime, but it might have been ‘third time doomed’ for the democratic 
transformation process. Current evidence readily suggests that the 2002 NARC 
victory was a revolution without revolution. As the fourth election grows near, the 
Kenyan democratization process remains caught between the deep blue sea and 
the devil, facing as it is contradictions which do not seem to be amenable to 
solutions within the context of multiparty politics and the neo-liberal ideology in 
which it is couched. In the next chapter, I revisit the question of social class in 
both the theory and practice of democracy as away of concluding my analysis of 
the stalled democratic transformation process in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Class Character of the State and the Kenyan Democratic Impasse: Some 
Reflections on the Liberal Democracy Debate. 
 
Looking at the stalemate in the Kenya’s democratic transformation process, it is 
tempting to concur with Anthony Arblaster’s observation that “democracy both in 
ancient Greece and in the politics of the last two centuries has never been achieved 
without struggle, and that struggle has always been, in good part, a type of class struggle, 
even if it is very simply characterized, as it was by many Greeks as a struggle of the 
many poor against the few who are rich and well-born” (Arblaster 1987:14). The 
evolution of the Athenian democracy posed a challenge to the established social 
order and this explains the vigor with which it was both resisted and embraced by 
its detractors and proponents respectively. As E.M, Wood asserts, “the ancient 
concept of democracy grew out of a historical experience which had conferred a unique 
civic status on subordinate classes” (Wood 1995:204). But supposedly founded on 
empiricism, the behaviorist foundation of the current neo-liberal thesis and its 
predecessor, modernization theory rule out of academic discourse historical 
accounts that have shaped the antagonisms in the democratic process of states, and 
which heightened with the rise of capitalism. 
 
The attraction of the debate on democracy to empiricism or behaviorism divorced 
social inquiry from history and served the wider post war ideological context 
which treated or still treats the capitalist world system as a natural and given order 
and not a product of a specific historical development. This conclusion gets 
support in Colin Leys’ statement worth quoting at length, that “whereas the early 
theorists of rising capitalism thought it essential to locate it in a broad conception of 
history, most Western theorists of development in the post war years (and majority of 
them were Westerners) avoided doing so because it meant unavoidably taking seriously 
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the work of Marx which at the height of the cold war was not merely considered 
unscientific, but in the U.S.A could easily cost you your job” (Leys 1996:6). The post 
war behavioral revolution in American social sciences which subsequently gained 
prominence in international academia is seen an important ideological plank in 
defense of a social order. This is further captured by Ole wæver who in a 
somewhat different context states that “American social science had become 
empiricist, abstaining from studying underlying (allegedly “metaphysical”) causes and 
searching for prediction and control. This fit with both ameliorist ambitions and 
universities controlled by businessmen. Searching for complex “underlying” causal 
determinants of, for instance poverty  could be dangerous, whereas empiricism 
apologetically conserves the frameworks of givens and points to conformist remedies” 
(Wæver 1998:712-713). Behaviorism sought to relegate structural analysis of 
capitalism to the background. 
 
But the historical spread of global capitalism and its attendant class antagonisms 
remain central to the developments that have shaped the evolution of the theory 
and practice of democracy. More so, it occupies a conspicuous centre-stage in the 
struggle for democratic transformation in states like Kenya where issues revolving 
around poverty and class inequality remain central.  The growth of capitalism 
remains highly relevant if one agrees with Escobar’s observation that “massive 
poverty in the modern sense appeared only when the market economy broke down 
community ties and deprived millions of people from access to land, water; and other 
resources. With the consolidation of capitalism, systemic pauperization became 
inevitable”(Escobar 1995:22). 
 
Liberal democracy which developed in the eighteenth century in Western Europe 
was, unlike its Athenian counterpart not a question of the ruled liberating 
themselves from political domination but a case of propertied classes asserting 
their claims in the face of encroaching popular rule. As such liberal democracy 
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drew its inspiration from ancient Rome and the city states of Renaissance Italy and 
not the historical reality that evolved in Athens. E.M, Wood contends that “if the 
peasant-citizen is the most representative figure of the first historical drama (Athenian 
democracy), in the second (Anglo-American liberal democracy) the feudal baron and the 
Whig aristocrat” (Ibid: 204).  
 
The growth of capitalism fused with the philosophy of liberal individualism which 
predated it to form a foundation for liberal democracy where both individual and 
class privileges could be maintained. As E.M, Wood further argues “the idea of 
liberal democracy became thinkable- and I mean literally thinkable- only with the 
emergence of capitalist social property relations. Capitalism made possible the 
redefinition of democracy, its reduction to liberalism”. (Ibid: 34). Liberal democracy 
established the distinction between the political and the public sphere regulated by 
the state and the family and the private sphere regulated by the individual and the 
market. This resulted in the conceptualization of what became known as the ‘civil 
society’ understood as something constitutively separate and independent from the 
state. The redefined concept of democracy thus enacted capitalist relations while 
underlining formal and juridical equality. 
 
The above view is also expressed in Anthony Arblaster’s analysis where he points 
out that liberal representative democracy reconciled the concept of democracy 
with class inequality seen from the antique as the antithesis of democratic rule. He 
argues that the modern version of democracy is “rooted in the perception of society 
as a collection of disparate and even conflicting interests- such as those of the rich and 
poor- with a democratic system of government being one in which these different rights 
are recognized as legitimate and therefore have a voice……class and inequalities are 
acceptable as permanent and ineradicable” (Arblaster 1987:41). This view sees the 
institutions with which liberal democracy is identified as free elections, formal 
equality before the law and so forth as having developed in opposition to direct 
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and popular democracy of which the Athenian model was the outstanding 
example.  
 
The above is what prompts Arblaster to conclude that modern day elite theory of 
which liberal democracy is an integral part is a continuation, if not in a more 
sophisticated manner, of the resistance popular democracy engendered from the 
established classes dating back to the antique. He states that liberal democracy 
theorists like Joseph Schumpeter, Raymond Aron, Martin Lipset, Walter Lipmann 
and others have been “able to get the best of both worlds. They could claim to be 
defending democracy while simultaneously denouncing the very tendencies and 
aspirations which led their less sophisticated predecessors like Plato (my addition) to 
condemn or criticize democracy as such” (ibid: 52-53). Liberal democracy was born 
out of class antagonisms and this means that class analysis remains central in 
understanding the implicit ideological underpinnings that inform both the theory 
and practice of democracy. 
 
The analytical marriage between democracy and the political institutions of 
Western industrialized states (the implicit ideal in understanding political 
developments in non industrialized states) is thus not only ahistorical but also 
hinders the search for alternative conceptual tools in understanding the impasse in 
which the democratic transformation in states like Kenya are caught. Ahistorical 
because it fails to appreciate the specific historical development of capitalism and 
how this structured the fusion of the democratic ideal with liberalism in defense of 
class privileges. The implicit assumption that states like Kenya will follow the 
same pattern of development experienced by Western states is controversial and 
reflects reluctance to underline the historical specificity of the rise of the nation 
state and capitalism. The presentation of the state as a neutral institution or a 
Gallup institute that registers and aggregates the preferences of conflicting social 
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groups remains highly problematic as it downplays the class character of the state 
which arguably makes it an autonomous political and economic institution.  
 
A look at Kenya’s post colonial political and economic development quickly 
reveals social class antagonism as an outstanding feature in the struggle for 
democratic transformation. The first decade after decolonization was, as I have 
argued above relatively favorable for capital accumulation due to the post war 
economic boom. The importance of the state as an instrument for capital 
accumulation became highly visible as the predominantly Kikuyu elite around 
Kenyatta moved to occupy “one sector after another of the modern Kenyan economy 
during the post independence years” (Leys 1996: 144). The conflict which followed 
in the wake of this development saw this new elite use the apparatus of the state in 
opposing economic changes like land redistribution which would have 
undermined their newly acquired status.  
 
Multiparty politics or political pluralism heightened the struggle for state control 
among the elite after 1992. The process also rejuvenated the hopes of the majority 
of the Kenyan population who saw in it a chance for a genuine democratic 
transformation that would transcend mere electoral transition. But as demonstrated 
by the current government’s resistance to reforming the state, state control as a 
basis for capital accumulation remains an important stumbling block in realizing 
economic transformations that can tackle the problems of social inequality, 
poverty, unemployment and economic stagnation which in the long run pose a 
threat to political stability. The “extraordinary resistance that still exists to the idea that 
there are classes and class struggle in Africa, let alone that they may be of central 
importance” (Leys 1975: xii) is due to the behavioral analytical framework that de-
emphasizes structural variables and downplays the conflictual nature of 
democracy. 
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Granted as I have argued that social class remains an important variable in 
understanding the stalemate in Kenya’s democratic transformation, one would 
then concur with the views expressed by the editors of Review of African Political 
Economy that multiparty politics “do not of themselves imply participation, 
representativeness, accountability or transparency. They may be essential to the 
possibility of reducing inequalities and reducing oppression but they do not accomplish 
this of their own accord” (ROAPE no 54, 1992: 6). And if it is true as they further 
claim that multiparty political competition “serves as a system through which class 
dominance and various forms of systemic inequalities are perpetuated and legitimated” 
(ibid: 6), then it can rightfully be argued that despite opening the space for 
political competition, the current multiparty project in Kenya is unlikely to form a 
basis for consolidating domestic harmony and political stability. 
 
Teetering on the brink of resorting to authoritarian tendencies of the last decades, 
the class character of the Kenyan democratic impasse is becoming more apparent 
as those who yesterday championed the anti-corruption crusade in opposition to 
the Moi state find graft and state patronage the most convenient way of wealth 
accumulation once in control of the state machinery. The rhetoric might have 
changed, but the substance remains the same and in a comparative perspective, the 
NARC regime is characterized more by continuity than by any significant shift 
from the governing tactics and policies employed by the Moi regime it succeeded. 
A recent study conducted by ‘Society for International Development’ on the 
growing specter of social inequality states that “income is heavily skewed in favor of 
the rich and against the poor; the country’s top 10% households control 42% of the total 
income while the bottom 10% control less than 1%”. (SID 2004: 5).  
 
It is doubtful that the above social class disparities will be addressed within the 
context of multiparty politics and its ‘one size fits all’ model of market 
liberalization and deregulation. On a longer view however, the Kenyan democratic 
 79
impasse is likely to drag into the longer future, periodically resurfacing as part of a 
wider search by the less privileged majority of a system that transcends the 
limitations put on democracy by its liberal version which shield the economic 
sphere from democratic intervention in a bid to maintain class inequalities, and of 
which multiparty politics is a manifestation. How such a development might 
unfold in the long run is subject to different interpretations and lies outside the 
scope of this paper. One can however say that what is diminishing is the euphoria 
from the last decade that political and market liberalization bore the solution to the 
question of domestic peace and political stability in states like Kenya. What has 
yet to be conceptualized is a model that embraces the conflictual nature of the 
democratic transformation process as it has unfolded over the periods in Kenya 
and its basis in what can rightly be characterized as conflicting class claims. 
 
 
A society characterized by profound social inequalities like Kenya stands the risk 
of increasing tides of violence (as highlighted by the current surging waves of 
crime) and discontent that threaten the long term prospect for political stability. 
If modernization theory which dominated the academic discourse on ‘third world’ 
development and democracy in the first decades after the war was an intellectual 
tool for prosecuting the cold war, then it might as well be said today that 
multiparty politics and its neo-liberal ideology could equally be an intellectual tool 
for projecting the aims and objectives of global capitalism in the post cold war era. 
To the extent that economic measures aimed at reducing social inequality, 
unemployment or poverty remain in conflict with this overall objective, the 
prospect of political instability and disorder is likely to hang over the Kenyan 
polity as much as it has done in the last decades.  
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Acronyms 
 
KANU Kenya African national Union 
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union 
FORD  Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
FORD-K Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya 
FORD-A Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (original) 
DP  Democratic Party 
KSC  Kenya Social Congress 
NARC National Rainbow Coalition 
CRCK Constitutional Review Commission of Kenya 
KPU  Kenya People’s Union 
NDP  National development Party 
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party 
NAK  National Alliance of Kenya 
IPPG  Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group 
NCEC  National Convention executive Council 
NCA  National Constitutional assembly 
CRCK Constitutional Review Commission of Kenya 
NPK  National Party of Kenya 
CCM  Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) 
UPC  Uganda People’s Party 
GEMA Gikuyu, Embu, Meru & Akamba 
KACC Kenya Anti-corruption Commission 
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